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ARTICLES
MISTAKES IN WILLS RESULTING FROM
SCRIVENERS' ERRORS: THE
ARGUMENT FOR REFORMATION
Joseph W. deFuria, Jr. *
A will is usually the most important document of a lifetime. Spouses are
provided for, children are rewarded, favored freinds are remembered.
Others may be intentionally slighted. The instrument encompasses a gamut
of emotions; it not only allows the testator to dispose of his property at
death, but also forces him to sort out his feelings for those who have most
affected his life. Whatever its provisions, a will provides great comfort to a
testator; he is secure in the knowledge that his affairs are in order.
Considering the importance of such a document, one might expect that
drafting mistakes discovered after the death of the testator would be easy to
correct. After all, estate law teaches that the intention of the testator is of
paramount concern in construing a will. Ironically, the law makes virtually
no allowance for human error in the drafting of this ultimate document.'
Instead, most courts disallow reformation of a will after probate to correct a
mistake,2 even if the mistake is a scrivener's error. Thus, property may be
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1. Nor does the law allow for mistakes in the execution of the document. Execution
statutes must be strictly followed to ensure that a will can be probated. See, e.g.. In re Peters.
107 N.J. 263, 526 A.2d 1005 (1987); Dukeminier. Cleansing the Stables of Property: .4 River
Found at Last, 65 IOWA L. REV. 151, 154-57 (1979). Professor John Langbein has suggested
that a doctrine of substantial compliance'be adopted to cure the results of defective execution.
See Langbein, Substantial Compliance With the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 513-30
(1975). In other words, if a will "substantially complies" with the applicable execution statute,
it should be probated. Id.
2. See T. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS § 58, at 273-81 (2d ed. 1953).
3. In this Article, the terms "scrivener" or "drafter" or words of similar import refer to
the person who drafts the will, whether a layman or professional. Thus, it encompasses both
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dispersed to unintended beneficiaries, and named beneficiaries may receive
unintended dispositions.4
Testators would be shocked to learn that relatively "minor" scriveners'
errors can completely thwart their last wishes.5 Such drafting errors fre-
quently result in unjust enrichment to an unintended beneficiary, against the
testator's wishes.6
The rationale behind the general axiom that a will may not be reformed
after probate to correct a mistake is that the danger of fraud is too great,
especially when the one person who unquestionably knows what was in-
tended-the testator-is unable to testify. Introduction of extrinsic evidence
to correct the mistake would sanction unattested testamentary language, in
direct violation of the Statute of Wills. Reformation would, therefore,
weaken the internal structure of the formalism of estate law.7
This Article argues that a scrivener's error in drafting a will, including one
that results in an omission from the document, should be correctable in de-
termining the operation of a will. A drafting error is an innocent misrepre-
sentation made by the drafter to the testator. The effect of the
misrepresentation on the testator is similar to the effect of fraud, undue influ-
ence, or duress, in that such conduct vitiates the intent of the testator. Con-
ordinary typists and learned attorneys. The is term not intended to cover the author of a
holographic will.
4. Discussion of an attorney's liability for negligently drafting a will, including liability
for acts of his agents, is outside the scope of this Article. For further discussion on this point,
see generally Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161. 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969) (attorney
can be held liable to intended will beneficiaries for failure to fulfill client's testamentary direc-
tions);.Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961) (same), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Johnston, Legal Malpractice in Estate Planning-Perilous Times
Ahead/br the Practitioner, 67 IowA L. REV. 629 (1982) (attorney can be held liable for negli-
gent estate planning).
5. Generally, scriveners' mistakes are imputed to the testator because once the testator
has executed his will, he is deemed to have read it and to know of its contents. See Leonard v.
Stanton, 93 N.H. 113, 36 A.2d 271 (1944) (scrivener's error binding an testator); Farmers &
Merchants Bank v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 158 W. Va. 1012, 1019, 216 S.E.2d 769, 773
(1975) (same); G. THOMPSON, THE LAW OF WILLS § 136, at 215 (3d ed. 1947) (same); see also
Mahoney v. Grainger, 283 Mass. 189, 191, 186 N.E. 86, 87 (1933) (draftsman's error did not
authorize court to reform executed will).
6. Professors John Langbein and Lawrence Waggoner, advocates of a "remedy-wrong-
doing" rationale (that there should be a remedy for the "wrong doing" or mistake), propose
that mistake cases should follow the rationale behind the imposition of a constructive trust,
which allows reformation whenever an error regarding a beneficiary has been made in drafting
a will, See Langbein & Waggoner. Rcformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake Change of
Direction in .4merican Law?. 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521. 571-77 (1982).
7. Earlier commentators reasoned that attempted reformation constituted a collateral
attack on the decree of the probate court, or that a request for reformation actually constituted
one for specific performance, which could not be granted because there was no consideration
between testator and beneficiary. G. THOMPSON. supra note 5, § 137.
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sequently, courts should be able to cure a scrivener's mistake by allowing in
extrinsic evidence to prove the error, just as they now do in cases involving
fraudulent, deceptive, or unsavory conduct.8 Any danger of evidentiary
fraud could be minimized, if not eliminated, by requiring the mistake to be
proven by clear and convincing evidence. 9
This Article first examines the orthodox view of scriveners' errors within
the general framework of rules that virtually prohibit reformation for mis-
take. Next, this Article analogizes the effect of a drafter's mistake to that of
an innocent misrepresentation, which, from the viewpoint of the admissibil-
ity of extrinsic evidence, should be treated in the same manner as a claim of
fraud, undue influence, or duress. Within this overall context, the growing
trend among courts to liberalize the traditional rules regarding the admis-
sion of extrinsic evidence in will construction cases to ascertain the intent of
the testator takes on new meaning. This Article then explores other areas of
estate law in which some courts routinely allow corrections to be made in
wills, either under the guise of construction or by way of more conventional
dogma. Finally, this Article compares its premise with established rules of
reformation for inter vivos instruments, particularly will substitutes, to rein-
force the argument that a scrivener's mistake, including one that results in
an omission from a will, should be correctable.
I. THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW: No REFORMATION FOR MISTAKE
Courts have always regarded the testator's intent as the touchstone in con-
struing or interpreting the language of a will, but are generally unwilling to
grant reformation to correct a mistake in a will after its probate.' ° This
attitude is explained in part by a traditional insistence on strict compliance
with the formalistic requirements of the Statute of Wills, and in part by a
more practical concern about evidentiary fraud in permitting the introduc-
tion of extrinsic evidence to prove a mistake when the testator is no longer
available to testify." Thus, the testator's intent, absent any ambiguity in the
8. See Connecticut Junior Republic v. Sharon Hosp., 188 Conn. 1, 21-27, 448 A.2d 190,
199-202 (1982) (Peters, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a scrivener's error is akin to an innocent
misrepresentation and that extrinsic evidence should be admissible).
9. Id. at 26-27, 448 A.2d at 202.
10. If the mistake is detected before probate, sufficient grounds may exist for invalidating
the instrument as a will, and extrinsic evidence may be admitted to prove that the document
lacks animus testandi. See, e.g., Fuller v. Nazal, 259 Ala. 598, 67 So. 2d 806 (1953).
11. See, e.g., Lomax v. Lomax, 218 Ill. 629. 634-35, 75 N.E. 1076, 1078 (1905) (unambig-
uous language cannot be reformed); Hoover v. Roberts, 144 Kan. 58, 60-61, 58 P.2d 83, 84-85
(1936) (mistake cannot be corrected by excising one term and substituting another); Van Elten
v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 119 Mich. App. 277. 287, 326 N.W.2d 479, 484 (1982) (probate
court does not have equitable jurisdiction to entertain reformation action); Barrier v. Lehr, 190
19901
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terms of the will, 2 must come from the actual language of the instrument
itself 3 and not from conjecture about what the testator may have intended
by the language he used.' 4 The inquiry focuses on the meaning of the words
chosen by the testator, not on the meaning which the testator may have had
but did not express."S The central question is, therefore, "not what the testa-
tor meant to say but what lie meant by what he did say."' 6 Most commenta-
tors have reiterated the "no reformation for mistake" rule with little
discussion. 7 Despite the overriding importance which courts attach to the
intent of the testator in determining the operation of a will, courts will not
permit extrinsic evidence to show what the testator truly intended, even if it
is certain that there has been a mistake. Testamentary formalities clearly
take precedence over substantive considerations.
Courts have also applied the no reformation rule when the mistake is a
result of a scrivener's error, whether from ignorance, oversight, or inadver-
Miss. 77, 90, 199 So. 273, 277 (1940) (court cannot correct mistaken terms); Sadler v. Sadler,
184 Neb. 318, 322, 167 N.W.2d 187, 189 (1969) (citing G. THOMPSON, supra note 5, § 136)
(testator's execution of his will ratifies any mistakes therein); Chrisman v. Cornell Univ., I N.J.
Super. 486, 489-90, 62 A.2d 157, 158-59 (Ch Div. 1948) (court cannot correct errors of a
testator); Brokaw v. Peterson, 15 N.J. Eq. 194 (Prerog. Ct. 1854) (reformation is not available
for mistake); In re Estate of Cruse, 103 N.M. 539. 541, 710 P.2d 733, 735 (1985) (extrinsic
evidence is admissible to interpret a will, but is not admissible to show a mistake by the testa-
tor); In re Arnold's Estate, 200 Misc. 909, 911-12, 107 N.Y.S.2d 356, 358-59 (Sur. Ct. 1951)
(testator's mistaken belief about living relatives is not grounds for denying probate to will),
aftd, 282 A.D. 670, 122 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1953).
12. Different rules relating to the admissibility of extrinsic evidence often apply when
courts construe ambiguous will provisions. For further discussion on this point, see infra text
accompanying notes 61-78.
13. See Fersinger v. Martin, 183 Md. 135, 140, 36 A.2d 716, 719 (1944).
14. See Appleton v. Rea, 389 Ill. 222, 226, 58 N.E.2d 854, 856 (1945).
15. See Steinbrenner v. Dreher, 140 Ohio St. 305, 309-10, 43 N.E.2d 283, 285 (1942)
(holding that the actual words chosen by a testator determine her intent).
16. In re Estate of Winslow, 259 Iowa 1316, 1322, 147 N.W.2d 814, 818 (1967) (quoting
In re Estate of Hogan, 259 Iowa 888, 889, 146 N W.2d 257, 258 (1966)). Although extrinsic
evidence may not be introduced to ascertain the intent of the testator, evidence of the testator's
surroundings, including his family situation and his business and financial circumstances, is
generally admissible to help the court understand how the language used in the will applies to
the facts of the case. See Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Noll, 125 N.J. Eq. 106, 107, 4 A.2d 379,
380 (Ch. 1939); In re Estate of Wendl, 37 Wash. App. 894, 897, 684 P.2d 1320, 1323 (1984).
17. See. e.g., Carr, Judicial Treatment of'Ambiguous, Mistaken, and Uncertain Testamen-
tary Dispositions: An Analysis of Iowa Cases. 24 DRAKE L. REV. 409, 415 (1975); see also 4 W.
PAGE, WILks, § 32.9, at 270 (Cum. Supp. 1990) (evidence not admissible to show testator's
intent where error was by draftsman); G. THOMPSON, supra note 5, § 137, at 426 (courts
rarely, if ever, grant reformation of a will for mistake); 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2471, at
241 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970) (evidence admissible to interpret ambiguous words and phrases
of document). But see Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 6, at 577-86 (suggesting a principled
reformation doctrine in lieu of "no reformation for mistake" rule); Warren, Fraud, Undue
Influence, and Mistake in Wills, 41 HARV. L. REV. 309 (1928) (generally discussing mistake
and its application in several early cases).
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tence. t8 Courts have reasoned that to allow reformation would be to permit
changes to the language of the document in direct violation of the Statute of
Wills. Interpretation or construction is one thing; altering the language of
the instrument after the death of the testator is another. Courts have treated
omissions from wills caused by scriveners' errors similarly, notwithstanding
proof positive that the omission was a mistake.' 9 Even proffered testimony
by the scrivener that the mistake was his rather than the testator's has not
persuaded courts to admit such evidence and reform the document. 20 Fol-
18. See In re Estate of Blacksill, 124 Ariz. 130, 602 P.2d 511 (Ct. App. 1979) (reformation
denied despite scrivener's testimony that he made a mistake); Brunk v. Merchants Nat'l Bank,
217 Ark. 499, 504-05, 230 S.W.2d 932, 935 (1950) (mistaken amount of bequest will not trig-
ger reformation); In re Estate of Mullin, 128 So. 2d 617 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (validity of
codicil unaffected by scrivener's error); Rivard v. Rivard, 285 Il1. 564, 121 N.E. 212 (1918)
(will cannot be reformed for scrivener's error); Fowler v. Black, 136 Ill. 363, 378, 26 N.E. 596,
598 (1891) (scrivener's mistake not grounds for reformation of a deed); Union Planter's Nat'l
Bank v. Inman, 588 S.W.2d 757, affid, 588 S.W.2d 763 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979) (court would
not set aside will because of mistake of law or fact by the testator); In re Estate of Gray, 265
Wis. 217, 61 N.W.2d 467 (1953) (testimony of attorney-draftsman held inadmissible to show
that the wording of a bequest was result of mistake); In re Will of Klagstad, 264 Wis. 269, 58
N.W.2d 636 (1953) (court had no jurisdiction to correct attorney's substitution of word
"nieces" for "nephews").
19. See Hall v. Killingsworth, 253 F.2d 43 (D.D.C. 1958) (per curiam) (court will not
supply name of beneficiary which was unwittingly omitted); Azar v. Azar, 262 Ala. 547, 550,
80 So. 2d 277, 280 (1955) (parol evidence not admissible to show terms that testator intended
but did not use); In re Estate of Townsend, 221 Cal. App. 2d 25, 27-28, 34 Cal. Rptr. 275, 277
(1963) (court will not correct mistake of omission); Bimslager v. Bimslager, 323 11. 303, 306,
154 N.E. 135, 136 (1926) (evidence not admissible to add words to will); Stevenson v. Steven-
son, 285 Ill. 486, 494, 121 N.E. 202, 205 (1918) (same); Engelthaler v. Engelthaler, 196 11.
230, 234-35, 63 N.E. 669, 670 (1902) (court declined to supply omitted name of beneficiary);
Leibrandt v. Adler, 30 Ill. App. 2d 257, 262, 174 N.E.2d 228, 230 (1961) (extrinsic evidence
not admissible to add terms to will); In re Estate of Fairley, 159 N.W.2d 286, 290 (Iowa 1968)
(obvious omission not correctable); Hoover v. Roberts, 144 Kan. 58, 60-61, 58 P.2d 83, 84
(1936) (substitution of one phrase for another not permitted); Ratliff v. Yost, 263 Ky. 239,
248-49, 92 S.W.2d 95, 99 (1936) (terms will not be added to will on basis of extrinsic evidence);
Deboe v. Brown, 231 Ky. 682, 687, 22 S.W.2d 111, 114 (1929) (extrinsic evidence inadmissible
to add words to will); De Benedictis v. De Benedictis, 21 N.J. Super. 479, 483, 91 A.2d 368,
370 (Ch. Div. 1952) (omission made by a scrivener not correctable by parol evidence); In re
Estate of Salvan, 132 A.D.2d 662, 664, 518 N.Y.S.2d 154, 156 (1987) (court will not correct
omission); In re Kronen, 114 A.D.2d 1033, 1033, 495 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (1985) (court will not
rewrite will or supply an omission), afid, 67 N.Y.2d 587, 496 N.E.2d 678, 505 N.Y.S.2d 589
(1986); Burger v. Hill, I Bradf. 360, 374 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1850) (court had no jurisdiction to
supply omission by inserting words in will); Yates v. Cole, 54 N.C. (I Jones Eq.) 75, 77-78
(1853) (inadvertently omitted words from will cannot be supplied); Farah v. First Nat'l Bank,
624 S.W.2d 341, 346 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (court will not supply alleged omission from will);
Holcomb v. Newton, 226 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (court will not supply omit-
ted name of beneficiary); Graham v. Graham, 23 W. Va. 36, 41 (1883) (court refused to insert
necessary clause to rectify omission).
20. See Connecticut Junior Republic v. Sharon Hosp., 188 Conn. i, 448 A.2d 190 (1982)
(scrivener's testimony is inadmissible to reinstate omitted beneficiaries); McFarland v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 32 Conn. Supp. 20, 37, 337 A.2d 1, 6 (1973) (evidence that testator
19901
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lowing the general rule for mistakes, most commentators have reaffirmed
that rule with respect to omissions.2 ' Even though courts profess great con-
cern about ascertaining the true intent of the testator, they often disregard
that very intent when construing the provisions of a will in cases involving
scriveners' mistakes, including omissions. Courts forget that language has
enough limitations of its own without imposing additional barriers to hinder
its interpretation.
There is, however, one type of case where courts appear willing to rectify
mistakes, including those of a scrivener. When the mistake is apparent from
the face of the will, and the testator's intent is also clear from the document
itself, courts will correct the error.22 Because the written words furnish the
basis for the correction, courts remain consistent in their concern for testa-
mentary formalities. Courts react the same way to cases involving mistakes
of omission by the testator or scrivener, provided that the intent of the testa-
tor is apparent from the will.23 One state even requires the correction of
directed scrivener to write something different from that which appears in will is inadmissible),
affd, 168 Conn. 411, 362 A.2d 834 (1975); In re Estate of Winslow, 259 Iowa 1316, 1321-23,
147 N.W.2d 814, 818 (1967) (scrivener's testimony is not admissible to add to terms of will);
Schwartz v. BayBank Merrimack Valley, N.A., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 169, 176, 456 N.E.2d 1141,
1146 (1983) (extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to show inadvertent omission by testator or
mistake by scrivener), review denied, 391 Mass. 1102, 459 N.E.2d 825 (1984); Lee v. Gaylord,
239 Mich. 274, 279-80, 214 N.W. 104, 106 (1927) (court cannot correct omission based on
parol evidence from the scrivener); Goode v. Goode, 22 Mo. 518, 522 (1856) (evidence is not
admissible to fill in words omitted by drafter); Andress v. Weller, 3 N.J. Eq. 604, 610 (Prerog.
Ct. 1832) (omission made by scrivener in preparing will cannot be supplied by parol evidence);
In re Stem's Will, 117 N.Y.S.2d 374, 375 (Sur. Ct. 1950) (omission may not be supplied by
oral testimony); In re Estate of Kelly, 473 Pa. 48, 54, 373 A.2d 744, 747 (1977) (declarations
made by testator to scrivener are not admissible to add to terms of will); Harrison v. Morton,
32 Tenn. (2 Swan) 461, 469 (1852) (proof of omission is not allowed into evidence); Farmers &
Merchants Bank v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 158 W. Va. 1012, 1019, 216 S.E.2d 769, 773
(1975) (parol evidence of draftsman may not be admitted to fill in a blank in will).
21. See, e.g., Gray, Striking Words Out of a Will, 26 HARV. L. REV. 212, 215 (1913); see
also T. ATKINSON, supra note 2, § 58, at 274-75 (no remedy on probate for mistakes of
omission).
22. See In re Estate of Lyon, 36 Cal. App. 2d 92, 95, 96 P.2d 1018, 1020 (1939); Arm-
strong v. Armstrong, 327 Ill. 85, 87-88, 158 N.E. 356, 357-58 (1927); Burke v. Central Trust
Co., 258 Mich. 588, 592, 242 N.W. 760, 761 (1932); Old Ladies Home v. Cooper, 206 Miss.
508, 516, 40 So. 2d 268, 270 (1949) (en banc); Boone Co. Nat'l Bank v. Edson, 760 S.W.2d
108, 111-12 (Mo. 1988) (en banc); In re Estate of Devries, 36 N.J. Super. 29, 35, 114 A.2d 742,
745-46 (App. Div. 1955); Swetland v. Swetland, 100 N.J. Eq. 196, 207, 134 A. 822, 827, (Ch.
1926), afd in part, 102 N.J. Eq. 294, 140 A. 279 (1928); Brokaw v. Peterson, 15 N.J. Eq. 194,
198 (Prerog. Ct. 1854); German Estate, 78 Pa. D. & C. 496, 499-501 (1951); Gifford v. Dyer, 2
R.I. 99, 102 (1852); see also In re Casper's Estate, 259 A.D. 56, 18 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1940) (court
will supply omission if error results in destruction of substantial part of a will and in unjust
enrichment to an unintended beneficiary).
23. See Cook v. Worthington, 116 Ark. 328, 333, 173 S.W. 395, 397 (1915); In re Estate
of Wood, 226 So. 2d 46, 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 232 So.2d 181 (Fla. 1969);
[Vol. 40:1
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mistakes or omissions in wills if they are apparent either from the context of
the will or from extrinsic evidence.24
Although the prevailing view of "no reformation for mistake" is wide-
spread, courts in a few jurisdictions have corrected mistakes and omissions
either by substituting one word or phrase for another,25 or by allowing the
scrivener's testimony to fill in a gap.26 These decisions are atypical and seem
to be based on a belief that the testator's actual intent is more important
than the strict ritual and evidentiary concerns that testamentary formalities
address.27
Generally, however, courts are unwilling to correct a mistake in a will
after probate, even though the error is that of the drafter. If finding the
Maxwell v. Maxwell, 122 N.J. Eq. 247, 250-51, 193 A. 719, 721 (Ch. 1937); Zabriskie v. Huy-
ler, 62 N.J. Eq. 697, 699, 51 A. 197, 198, (Ch.), affid, 64 N.J. Eq. 794, 56 A. 1133 (1902);
Shimer v. Shimer's Ex'rs, 50 N.J. Eq. 300, 302-03, 24 A. 385, 385 (Ch. 1892); Nelson v.
Combs, 18 N.J.L. 27, 38 (Sup. Ct. 1840); In re Dorson's Estate, 22 Misc. 2d 945, 946-47, 196
N.Y.S.2d 344, 346 (Sur. Ct. 1959); Kostos v. Anderson, 205 Okla. 655, 656, 240 P.2d 73, 74
(1952); Greer v. Anderson, 36 Tenn. App. 507, 517, 259 S.W.2d 550, 554 (1953); McCauley v.
Alexander, 543 S.W.2d 699, 700-01 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Neely v. Brogden, 239 S.W. 192,
194 (Tex. Ct. App. 1922).
24. The testator's own declarations of intent, however, are not admissible. See OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 174 (West 1970 & Supp. 1987). This section also codifies the orthodox
rule that extrinsic evidence may be admitted to explain a latent ambiguity in a will. For fur-
ther discussion on this point, see infra text accompanying notes 69-75.
25. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ikuta, 64 Haw. 236, 244-45, 639 P.2d 400, 406 (1981); Burier
v. Jones, 338 Mo. 679, 685, 92 S.W.2d 885, 887 (1936) (en banc); Paris v. Erisman, 300 S.W.
487, 490 (Mo. 1927); Baker v. Grossglauser, 250 S.W. 377, 379 (Mo. 1923); Estate of Devries,
36 N.J. Super. at 35-36, 114 A.2d at 745-46; Bottomley v. Bottomley, 134 N.J. Eq. 279, 288, 35
A.2d 475, 481-82 (1944); Barrett v. Barrett, 134 N.J. Eq. 138, 148, 34 A.2d 579, 585 (1943);
Herbert v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 131 N.J. Eq. 330, 337, 25 A.2d 7, 11 (Ch.),
affd, 132 N.J. Eq. 445, 28 A.2d 544 (1942); Rowe v. Rowe, 113 N.J. Eq. 344, 349, 167 A. 16,
19 (1933); Creveling's Ex'rs v. Jones, 21 N.J.L. 573, 579 (Sup. Ct. 1845); Andress v. Weller, 3
N.J. Eq. 604, 609-10 (Prerog. Ct. 1832); In re Menick's Will, 124 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Sur. Ct.
1953); In re Britt's Estate, 249 Wis. 30, 33, 23 N.W.2d 498, 500 (1946); see also Hilton v.
Kinsey, 185 F.2d 885, 888-89 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (words may be supplied in will); Jackson v.
Schultz, 38 Del. Ch. 332, 335-36, 151 A.2d 284, 287 (1959) ("to her and her heirs" reformed to
read "to her or her heirs").
26. See. e.g., In re Nossenheim's Will, 36 Misc. 2d 548, 549, 232 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1012
(Sur. Ct. 1962); In re Estate of Mangel, 51 Wis. 2d 55, 68, 186 N.W.2d 276, 282-83 (1971).
27. In one fairly recent and celebrated case, the New York Court of Appeals allowed
reformation of a reciprocal will which had been mistakenly signed by a husband instead of his
wife. Each had accidentally signed the other's identical will. The court permitted both wills to
be construed together to arrive at its result. The court, however, did not offer a significant
rationale, other than general equitable principles, for its unusual result. See In re Snide, 52
N.Y.2d 193, 194-97, 418 N.E.2d 656, 657-58, 437 N.Y.S.2d 63, 64-65 (1981); see also Com-
ment, Mistakenly Signed Reciprocal Wills: A Change in Tradition After In re Snide, 67 IOWA
L. REv. 205 (1981) (advocating a two-step approach which adheres to statutory requirements
and applies proper construction techniques to reach result analogous to Snide). A similar
Canadian case predated the Snide decision. See In re Brander, [1952] 4 D.L.R. 688, 689 (hus-
1990)
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testator's true intent is the paramount concern, extrinsic evidence should be
admitted to prove a drafter's mistake. Fixing the burden of proof at a clear
and convincing level would protect the reformation process from spurious or
fraudulent claims.
II. RELAXING THE No REFORMATION RULE FOR
SCRIVENERS' MISTAKES
Because scriveners' errors can encompass more than one type of mistake,
the effect of a drafter's error is often magnified. For example, an ostensibly
simple clerical error may result in a beneficiary taking much less or much
more of a pecuniary gift than the testator originally planned, while an error
in the use of technical language necessary to produce a particular outcome
may cause an altogether unintended beneficiary to receive the gift. Uninten-
tional departures from the testator's instructions or inaccurate advice from
the scrivener can produce similar results. The no reformation rule allows
these kinds of mistakes to go uncorrected, frequently producing inequitable
results and frustrating the testator's intent.
A case in point is Connecticut Junior Republic v. Sharon Hospital.28 In
Connecticut Junior, the testator instructed his attorney to draft a second cod-
icil to his will, implementing certain changes for tax purposes.29 In the first
codicil, the decedent had already had his attorney substitute another group
of charities for certain named charity beneficiaries of two trusts set up by the
band's name as beneficiary struck and wife's name substituted to admit reciprocal will to pro-
bate).
To some extent, the English tradition of no reformation for mistakes of omission presaged
the principles which most American courts have followed in this area. Older English cases
often held that an omission from a will could not be supplied by extrinsic evidence. See, e.g.,
In re Goods of Schott, 84 L.T.R. 571 (1901); In re Goods of Walkeley, 69 L.T.R. 419 (1893);
Shadbolt v. Waugh, 162 Eng. Rep. 1267, 1268 (1831); Wickens' Court, 28 L.T. 467, 469
(1813); Fawcett v. Jones, 161 Eng. Rep. 1375, 1394 (1810). But, like their American counter-
parts, English courts allowed reformation if what was omitted was apparent from the rest of
the will. See, e.g., Re Doland, [1969] 3 All E.R. 713; Re Riley's Will Trusts, [1962] 1 All E.R.
513; Re Whitrick, [1957] 2 All E.R. 467; Re Smith, [1947] 2 All E.R. 708. Conversely, there is
also some English authority for the proposition that an omission from a will can be supplied by
extrinsic evidence. See, e.g., Re Haygarth, 108 L.T. 756, 757-58 (1913); Castell v. Tagg, 163
Eng. Rep. 102 (1836). In addition, a recently enacted English statute allows courts to reform
wills in cases of clerical or other types of scriveners' errors. See Administration of Justice Act,
1982, ch. 53, § 20(1). English courts have also permitted mistakenly inserted words to be
deleted from a will. See, e.g., Morrell v. Morrell, 46 L.T.R. 485 (1882); see also Guardian,
Trust, and Ex'rs Co. v. Inwood, 1946 N.Z.L.R. 614, 624 (C.A.) (court admitted mistakenly
signed documents which omitted inconsistent first names). Here, however, American courts
have not always followed the English example. See Note, Omission of Mistaken Insertions in
Will Contests, 33 IND. L.J. 556 (1958).
28. 188 Conn. 1, 448 A.2d 190 (1982).
29. Id. at 3, 448 A.2d at 192.
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initial will.3" When drafting the second codicil, however, the attorney-scriv-
ener mistakenly omitted the second group of charities and reinstated the
group designated in the original will.3 The testator then executed the sec-
ond codicil without discovering the mistake. The error came to light only
after the testator had passed away.
The trial court held that extrinsic evidence of a scrivener's error was not
admissible to prove that the second codicil contained a drafter's mistake.32
The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed,33 reasoning that the ritual and
evidentiary policies underlying the Statute of Wills, buttressed by stare deci-
sis, outweighed the consequences of allowing the mistake to stand.34
In a strong dissent, Justice Peters argued that the true intent of a testator
should not be thwarted by a scrivener's mistake, especially where the error
substantially misstated the testator's directives.35 More to the point, a scriv-
ener's mistake can be looked upon as an innocent misrepresentation by the
drafter to the testator that the will presented to the testator for his signature
was the one prepared for him.36 Innocent misrepresentation is treated as the
equivalent of fraud in terms of its legal consequences.37 Nevertheless, courts
treat one type of innocent misrepresentation, the scrivener's error, the same
as a mistake resulting from fraudulent or unsavory conduct. 3' Thus, in a
proceeding to determine the admissibility of a will to probate, extrinsic evi-
dence should be admissible to prove the drafter's mistake.39 In other situa-
30. Id. at 3, 448 A.2d at 191.
31. Id. at 3-4, 448 A.2d at 192.
32. Id. at 4, 448 A.2d at 192.
33. Id. at 9, 448 A.2d at 194.
34. Id. at 14, 448 A.2d at 197-98.
35. Id. at 22, 448 A.2d at 200.
36. Id. at 23, 448 A.2d at 200.
37. See, e.g., Johnson v. Healy, 176 Conn. 97, 100, 405 A.2d 54, 56 (1978). For a sample
of the changing perspective which has taken place in this area of the law over the course of
time, see Crocker-Anglo National Bank v. Kuchman, 224 Cal. App. 2d 490, 36 Cal. Rptr. 806
(1964); Equitable Life Assurance Society v. New Horizons, Inc., 28 N.J. 307, 314, 146 A.2d
466, 470 (1958); Halpert v. Rosenthal, 107 R.I. 406, 267 A.2d 730 (1970); RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 471 comment b (1932); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 687-88, 711
(4th ed. 1971); S. WILUSTON, CONTRACTS § 1509, at 4212-13 (rev. ed. 1937); Bohlen, Misrep-
resentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty, 42 HARV. L. REV. 733 (1929); Keeton, Actiona-
ble Misrepresentation: Legal Fault as a Requirement, 2 OKLA. L. REV. 56, 58-59 (1949);
Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 HARV. L. REv. 415 (1911).
38. See also Smith v. Richards, 10 U.S. (13 Pet.) 26 (1839) (action to set aside land
purchase was valid regardless of whether misrepresentations were a product of fraud or mis-
take); Mears v. Accomac Banking Co., 160 Va. 311, 321, 168 S.E. 740, 743 (1933) (if misrepre-
sentation, whether made innocently or knowingly, is acted on, the effect is the same).
39. Connecticut Jr. Republic, 188 Conn. at 22, 448 A.2d at 201-02. In considering the
admissibility of extrinsic evidence, some courts have distinguished between probate proceed-
ings (to determine if there is sufficient animus testandi for the instrument to stand as a will)
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tions where the testator's intent is compromised or vitiated, as by fraud,
undue influence, or duress, courts permit the introduction of extrinsic evi-
dence to show that the will substantially misrepresents the true intent of the
testator.40 When a will is the product of malfeasance or fraudulent represen-
tation, not only is evidence of the testator's surroundings and circumstances
admissible,4 ' but also evidence of the testator's oral or written declarations
of intention or affection.4 2 The hearsay rule is avoided because evidence of
the testator's mental condition is relevant to his state of mind.43 Because the
testator's mental state is relevant, there is little justification for treating mis-
take or omission cases differently from those involving deceptive or fraudu-
lent conduct toward the testator."4
and construction proceedings (to interpret the meaning of the document). Many courts have
permitted the introduction of extrinsic evidence in the first instance but not the second. See,
e.g., Fuller v. Nazal, 259 Ala. 598, 67 So. 2d 806 (1953); In re Estate of Mullin, 128 So. 2d 617
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961); In re Estate of Burt, 122 Vt. 260, 169 A.2d 32 (1961); In re Kiag-
stad's Will, 264 Wis. 269, 58 N.W.2d 636 (1953). Connecticut law, however, made no such
distinction. See Connecticut Jr. Republic, 188 Conn. at 6-7, 448 A.2d at 193.
40. See Connecticut Jr. Republic, 188 Conn. at 15, 448 A.2d at 200.
41. For example, circumstantial evidence is usually admissible in undue influence cases
because acts of undue influence are rarely committed openly. See, e.g., Brown v. Emerson, 205
Ark. 735, 738, 170 S.W.2d 1019,1021 (1943); In re Will of Thompson, 248 N.C. 588, 593, 104
S.E.2d 280, 284 (1958); Kishfy v. Kishfy, 104 R.I. 61, 66-67, 241 A.2d 827, 830 (1968). Such
evidence is also admissible in fraud cases. See Brown v. Gardner, 159 Ind. App. 586, 589, 308
N.E.2d 424, 428 (1974).
42. See, e.g., Duckett v. Duckett, 134 F.2d 527, 528 (D.C. Cir. 1943); In re Estate of
Pohlmann, 89 Cal. App. 2d 563, 573, 201 P.2d 446, 453 (1949); In re Burton's Estate, 45 So.
2d 873, 875 (Fla. 1950); King v. MacDonald, 90 Idaho 272, 278-79, 410 P.2d 969, 972 (1966);
In re Rogers' Estate, 242 Iowa 627, 639, 47 N.W.2d 818, 820 (1951); Smith v. Salthouse, 147
Kan. 354, 363, 76 P.2d 836, 842 (1938); Tufts v. Poore, 219 Md. 1, 14-15, 147 A.2d 717, 724
(1959); Snyder v. Cearfoss, 190 Md. 151, 157, 57 A.2d 786, 789 (1948); Griffith v. Benzinger,
144 Md. 575, 593, 125 A. 512, 519 (1924); Matthews v. Turner, 581 S.W.2d 466, 472 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979); In re Estate of Polly, 174 Neb. 222, 225, 117 N.W.2d 375, 378 (1962); In re
Boyle's Will, 205 Misc. 497, 498, 128 N.Y.S.2d 259, 262 (Sur. Ct. 1954); Johnson v. Tomlin-
son, 160 N.W.2d 49 (N.D. 1968); Burkett v. Slauson, 256 S.W.2d 179, 185 (Tex. Civ. App.
1952).
43. See J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1378, at 178-85 (Chadbourn ed. 1976).
44. Interestingly, concepts of fraud, undue influence, and, to some extent, duress are very
much interrelated in estate law. In fact, courts and commentators often view these actions as
different manifestations of the same type of conduct by the perpetrator towards the testator.
See, e.g., Comment, Duress and Undue Influence-A Comparative Analysis, 22 BAYLOR L.
REV. 572 (1970); Comment, Fraud, Undue Influence, and Captation in Wills-A Comparative
Study, 34 TUL. L. REV. 585 (1960); Note, Wills-Undue Influence-Fraud, 10 U. PiTr. L.
REV. 602 (1949). In addition, the concepts of fraud and undue influence are often used inter-
changeably, even though there is a difference between the two. See, e.g., In re Estate of
Newhall, 190 Cal. 709, 718, 214 P. 231. 235 (1923); Wellman v. Carter, 286 Mass. 237, 253,
190 N.E. 493, 500 (1934); Gockel v. Gockel, 66 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Mo. 1933); In re Dand's
Estate, 41 Wash. 2d 158, 163-64, 247 P.2d 1016, 1020 (1952); Collins, Undue Influence in
Wills, 7 ARK. L. REV. 116, 117 (1952); Gifford, Will or No Will? The Effect of Fraud and
Undue Influence on Testamentary Instruments, 20 COLuM. L. REV. 862 (1920); Green, Fraud,
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A scrivener's mistake or innocent misrepresentation also bears some rela-
tionship to the concept of constructive fraud. Constructive fraud occurs
where the drafter's relationship to the testator tends to deceive others, to
violate private confidences, or to injure the public interest. 45 Thus, the testa-
tor may be justified in relying on the drafter to act in the testator's best
interest, especially if the scrivener is a lawyer. 46
When analyzed for their effect on testamentary acts, mistake and fraudu-
lent conduct are in large part functionally indistinguishable. 47 Fraud arises
from an inaccurate perception induced by another with the intention to
deceive, while mistake arises from an inaccurate perception induced by an-
other as a result of an innocent misrepresentation. Considering the similari-
ties between the effect on a will of an innocent misrepresentation or mistake
and that of deception or fraud, it is odd that courts treat these phenomena so
differently.4" One commentator has suggested that courts are more willing
Undue Influence, and Mental Incompetency, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 176, 180 (1943). But see
Estate of Smith, 212 Or. 481, 483, 320 P.2d 273, 274 (1958) (fraud exerted on testator is a class
of undue influence).
45. See Hornaday v. First Nat'l Bank, 259 Ala. 26, 36, 65 So. 2d 678, 687 (1952); McKin-
ley v. Overbay, 132 Ind. App. 272, 280, 177 N.E.2d 389, 393 (1961); Di Pippo v. Meyer, 24
Ohio App. 2d 86, 89, 263 N.E.2d 907, 909 (1970); Randall v. Dallas Power & Light Co., 745
S.W.2d 397, 400 (Tex. Civ. App. 1987), rev'd, 752 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1988); see also Stapleton,
The Presumption of Undue Influence, 17 U. NEW BRUNSWICK LJ. 46, 46 (1967) (doctrine of
constructive trust holds that transactions are not binding if inequitable and contrary to public
policy).
46. See Asleson v. West Branch Land Co., 311 N.W.2d 533, 539 (N.D. 1981); see also
Note, Executors and Administrators-Constructive Fraud on Probate Court, I MERCER L.
REV. 121 (1949) (fraud tends to deceive or injure others, or is detrimental to the public inter-
est); Note, The Virginia Doctrine of Constructive Fraud, I WASH. & LEE L. REV. 98, 98 n.2
(1939) (constructive fraud is the breach of a legal duty which tends to deceive others). A
finding of constructive fraud often requires that the party perpetrating the innocent deception
gain an advantage over the other party. See Barrett v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 183 Cal.
App. 3d 1362, 1369, 229 Cal. Rptr. 16, 20 (1986). In this case, the scrivener-testator relation-
ship would not be relevant to constructive fraud unless the scrivener were also an attorney
whose fee for preparing the will was considered a pecuniary or beneficial interest under the
will, rather than compensation for services rendered. Id.: see In re Estate of Small, 346 F.
Supp. 600, 601 (D.D.C. 1972) (attorney acting as paid executor in a will he drew up had a
financial interest which constituted a beneficial interest, voiding the commission earned); In re
Estate of Margow, 77 N.J. 316, 328, 390 A.2d 591, 597 (1978) (court refused to allow person
who gained position of executrix through unauthorized practice of law to benefit financially
from appointment).
47. See Henderson, Mistake and Fraud in Wills-Part I: A Comparative Analysis of Ex-
isting Law, 47 B.U.L. REV. 303, 305 (1967).
48. Id. at 385-88, 406; see also D. McDONALD & J. MONROE, KERR ON THE LAW OF
FRAUD AND MISTAKE 429-42 (7th ed. 1952) (courts provide relief if will was fraudulently
produced and omitted words); Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 6, at 581-83 (because testator
forms an intent that he communicates to his attorney, testator's intent should be respected if
attorney makes a mistake); Warren, supra note 17, at 333-39 (although courts find that al-
lowing evidence of mistake could be abused, the trend is to admit such evidence).
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to inquire into the underlying evidence surrounding fraudulent conduct be-
cause of the moral dishonesty associated with its perpetration.4 9 If the fun-
damental purpose of the will construction process is to ascertain the true
intent of the testator, however, conduct involving mistake and fraud should
be handled similarly. Courts should, therefore, admit extrinsic evidence to
prove the existence of a scrivener's error. After determining the nature of
the mistake, a court should be able to correct the error and reform the will.5°
Requiring clear and convincing evidence to prove the mistake substantially
lessens the danger of evidentiary fraud and answers many of the concerns
underlying the traditional deference that courts give to the Statute of
Wills."
III. THE TREND TOWARD ADMITTING EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IN WILL
CONSTRUCTION CASES
In the past, courts refused to admit extrinsic evidence in will construction
cases 2 because the written words of the will were are only words attested to
by witnesses and formally acknowledged by the testator as his last wishes.
Additionally, the parol evidence rule mandates that the written words alone
form the basis for the interpretation of a document expressing the testator's
desires.53 The recent trend among many courts, however, is to admit extrin-
sic evidence in will construction cases.
Conventional wisdom holds that explanations or interpretations of the
language of a will must come from the document itself and not from sources
49. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 2, § 56, at 264.
50. At the very least, a mistake or innocent misrepresentation should be rectified by the
imposition of a constructive trust, which is the relief often granted for fraud. See Langbein &
Waggoner, supra note 6, at 571-74.
51. Only a few jurisdictions have enacted legislation concerning the admission of extrinsic
evidence to correct mistakes or resolve ambiguities. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 105 (West
1956); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-94 (1982 & Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 174
(West 1990).
52. Courts view the admission of extrinsic evidence in a probate proceeding with much
less concern than the admission of extrinsic evidence for the construction of a will. Extrinsic
evidence must often be admitted in probate proceedings to determine if a will has present
testamentary intent, because those factors which often invalidate intent, such as undue influ-
ence, fraud, or duress, can only be proved by extrinsic evidence. Such evidence would include
the testator's declarations of feelings toward the particular claimants in the specific case. See
Slough, Testamentar Capacity." Evidentiary Aspects, 36 TEX. L. REV. 1, 27 (1957).
53. In many states, thc parol evidence rule encompasses not only contracts, but also deeds
and wills. See, e.g.. OR. REV. STAT. § 41.740 (1983) ("When the terms of an agreement have
been reduced to writing by the parties ... there can be ... no evidence of the terms of the
agreement, other than the contents of the writing .... The term 'agreement' includes deeds
and wills as well as contracts .... ); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-11-304 (1989) (extrinsic
evidence allowed where validity of agreement in dispute and mistake at issue).
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extrinsic to the instrument.5 4 A growing number of courts have reasoned,
however, that only by looking at the circumstances surrounding the writing
of a will can its provisions be placed in context." After all, extrinsic evi-
dence is necessary to identify the persons and property referred to in the will
and to enable the court to apply the words of the will to the matters to which
it relates. 6
Historically, these principles have been embodied by a calculus of eviden-
tiary rules-rules of construction which are applicable whenever a court at-
tempts to interpret or construe a will. The primary purpose of construction
is to ascertain the testator's intent, although just how accurately this can be
done is debatable.57 For example, courts have freqently misinterpreted the
testator's intent through the use of the plain meaning rule. The plain mean-
ing rule requires that the words of a will, absent any ambiguity, be inter-
preted using the most ordinary and customary meaning of the words,
without resorting to extrinsic evidence.5 8 Because the testator may mean
something entirely different from the ordinary use of a term, the plain mean-
54. This is particularly true when dealing with the testator's oral declarations. See 9 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2471, at 229 (3d ed. 1940).
55. Such circumstances can include the existing facts at the time of the will's execution,
the nature of the testator's property. the scheme of distribution, and the relationship to the
testator of those persons taking under the will. See Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Noll, 125 N.J.
Eq. 106, 109, 4 A.2d 379, 380 (Ch. 1939); Spencer v. Gutierrez, 99 N.M. 712, 714, 663 P.2d
371, 374 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 644, 662 P.2d 645 (1983); Smith, The Admissibility
of Extrinsic Evidence in Will Interpretation Cases, 64 MASS. L. REV. 123, 123 (1979); Com-
ment, Wills-Construction-Use of Extrinsic Evidence, 49 MICH. L. REV. 1262, 1262 (1951)
[hereinafter Comment, Wills-Construction]. Other courts, however, have held that evidence
of surrounding circumstances can be admitted only if there is an ambiguity in the language of a
will. These courts seem to ignore the fact that only by examining the testator's circumstances
at the execution of the will can the court apply the language of the will to the persons and
things named therein. See. e.g., Gustafson v. Svenson, 373 Mass. 273, 366 N.E.2d 761 (1977);
Hubbard v. Wiggins, 240 N.C. 197, 207, 81 S.E.2d 630, 637 (1954); Comment, Extrinsic Evi-
dence and the Construction of Wills in California. 50 CALIF. L. REV. 283, 291 (1962).
56. Evidence of the circumstances and conditions surrounding the testator is admitted in
part to place the court in the position of the testator at the time the will was executed. See In
re Estate of Russell, 69 Cal.2d 200. 207, 444 P.2d 353, 360, 70 Cal. Rptr. 561, 568 (1968): In re
Estate of Thompson, 164 N.W.2d 141, 146 (Iowa 1969); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Catholic Char-
ities, 141 N.J. Eq. 170, 174, 56 A.2d 483, 486 (Ch. 1948); Bottomley v. Bottomley, 134 N.J.
Eq. 279, 294, 35 A.2d 475, 483 (Ch. 1944); Huffman v. Huffman, 329 S.W.2d 139, 142 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1959), aff'd, 161 Tex. 267, 339 S.W.2d 885 (1960); In re Estate of Gehl, 39 Wis. 2d
206, 210, 159 N.W.2d 72, 75 (1968). The declarations of the testator, however, are normally
inadmissible unless the will is ambiguous. See infra text accompanying note 71.
57. See, e.g., 2 L. SIMES, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 307, at 14-15 (1936).
58. See Carroll v. Cave Hill Cemetery Co., 172 Ky. 204, 211, 189 S.W. 186, 189 (1916);
Emmert v. Hearn, 309 Md. 19, 23, 522 A.2d 377, 380 (1987); Comment, Wills-Construc-
tion-Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence, 94 U. PA. L. REV. 117, 118 (1945); see also Moseley
v. Goodman, 138 Tenn. 1. 15-16, 195 S.W. 590, 593 (1917) (ordinary words used in a will must
bear their customary use).
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ing rule can defeat the testator's actual intent.59 To some extent, the plain
meaning rule is offset by the "personal usage" exception, which allows the
admission of extrinsic evidence in will construction cases to show that the
testator habitually used particular words or phrases idiosyncratically refer-
ring to certain persons."
To complement the plain meaning rule, most courts developed a different
rule when confronted with ambiguous language in will construction cases.
Extrinsic evidence was sometimes admissible to help explain uncertain or
doubtful language in a will.6 ' The evidence could include facts relating to
the situation of the testator, such as his property, his family, and the claim-
ants under his will and their relation to him, and the circumstances existing
at the time of execution.62 Such evidence was admissible only to show
"what the testator meant by what he said, not to show what he intended to
say." 63 Another type of extrinsic evidence sometimes admissible in ambigu-
ity cases was direct evidence of the testator's actual intent. Direct evidence
of intent includes declarations of intention, informal writings or memoranda
that preceded the will, and statements to the scrivener as to the meaning of
the will's language.' Whether any extrinsic evidence was admissible and
59. The plain meaning rule has been under attack for some time. See, e.g., 9 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2462, at 197-99 (Chadbourn rev. 1980). According to Wigmore: "The fallacy
consists in assuming that there is or ever can be some one real or absolute meaning. In truth
there can be only some person's meaning; and that person, whose meaning the law is seeking, is
the writer of the document." Id. § 2462, at 198 (emphasis in original); see also RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 241 comment c, § 242 comment a (1940) (the language of the will is
considered to manifest the testator's or conveyor's intent).
60. See, e.g., Wettach v. Horn, 201 Pa. 201, 50 A. 1001 (1902); Moseley, 138 Tenn. at 13-
14, 195 S.W. at 592.
61. Using extrinsic evidence as a way to resolve ambiguities in a will is related to the parol
evidence rule that extrinsic evidence may help explain or supplement an ambiguous contract
but not contradict a written term. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (1989).
62. See Simons v. Bowers, 258 Ky. 755, 758, 81 S.W.2d 604, 605 (1935); White v. Ponder,
180 Ky. 386, 202 S.W. 867 (1918).
63. Quandee v. Skene, 321 N.W.2d 91 (N.D. 1982) (quoting McGuire v. Gaffney, 314
N.W.2d 851, 855 (N.D. 1982)); see In re Estate of Lenahan, 511 So. 2d 365, 371-72 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1987); see also Shulman v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 5 Conn. App. 561, 566,
501 A.2d 759, 761-62 (1985) (extrinsic evidence is admissible to clarify doubtful language in a
will).
64. See Graves, Extrinsic Evidence in Respect to Written Instruments, 2 VA. L. REV. 338,
347-49 (1915). Many courts blur the distinction between the admissibility of the testator's
declarations and evidence of the surrounding circumstances. Some courts hold that circum-
stantial evidence is always admissible, while declarations of intention can only be used if the
langauge of the will is ambiguous. See, e.g., Baliles v. Miller, 231 Va. 48, 340 S.E.2d 805
(1986); In re Estate of Bergau, 103 Wash. 2d 431, 439, 693 P.2d 703, 707 (1985); RESTATE-
MENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 242 comment j (1940) (for resolution of ambiguities, declara-
tions of intent are admissible). Other courts allow both types of evidence to be admitted. See,
e.g., In re Kremlick's Estate, 417 Mich. 237, 240, 331 N.W.2d 228, 230 (1983).
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sometimes the type of extrinsic evidence admissible often depended on
whether the ambiguity was considered "patent" or "latent." Some courts
enumerated a third type of ambiguity, called an "equivocation." How a
court defined these well-known ambiguities often determined under what
circumstances evidence extrinsic to the will could be used to interpret it.65
A patent ambiguity was one that was apparent on the face of the instru-
ment. For example, two provisions in a will may directly conflict with one
another. Consequently, no definite meaning can be ascertained from the lan-
guage. Most courts originally held that extrinsic evidence was not admissi-
ble to explain a patent ambiguity, even if the will failed as a result, because
allowing the admission of outside evidence would in effect create a new doc-
ument out of the conflicts and uncertainties of the original.66 The exclusion
of extrinsic evidence for patent ambiguities applied especially to the testa-
tor's declarations of intent.67 Thus, errors or omissions, whether made by
the testator or the scrivener, could not be corrected when a patent ambiguity
was involved.68
A latent ambiguity, which could be discovered only when the words of a
will were applied to the facts surrounding the estate of the testator, could be
explained by the use of extrinsic evidence.69 Because a latent ambiguity oc-
curred when a will was clear on its face, but raised a question of interpreta-
tion when applied to the facts of the situation, courts reasoned that extrinsic
evidence had to be used to ascertain the meaning of the testator.7° Such
65. In addition, existing statutory and case law could be extrinsic aids in resolving will
ambiguities. See In re Estate of McDonald, 20 Wis. 2d 63, 70, 121 N.W.2d 245, 248 (1963).
66. See Hauck v. Second Nat'l Bank, 153 Ind. App. 245, 261, 286 N.E.2d 852, 862 (1972).
67. See In re Estate of Watts, 186 Cal. 102, 105, 198 P. 1036, 1037 (1921); In re Boehm's
Will, 198 Misc. 994, 996, 101 N.Y.S.2d 812, 814 (Sur. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 281 A.D. 1069, 121
N.Y.S.2d 766 (1953); Holohan v. McCarthy, 130 Or. 577, 584, 281 P. 178, 180 (1929).
68. See Gafford v. Kirby, 512 So. 2d 1356, 1363 (Ala. 1987); Mills v. Wylie, 250 Ark. 703,
707-08, 466 S.W.2d 937, 941-42 (1971); In re Estate of Dominici, 151 Cal. 181, 185, 90 P. 448,
452 (1907); Fersinger v. Martin, 183 Md. 135, 140, 36 A.2d 716, 718 (1944); Gray v. McCaus-
land, 314 Mass. 743, 747, 51 N.E.2d 441, 443 (1943); Breckner v. Prestwood, 600 S.W.2d 52,
57 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); In re Estate of Welter, 598 S.W.2d 618, 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980);
Crist v. Nesbit, 352 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); Whelan v. Conroy, 126 N.J. Eq. 607,
613, 10 A.2d 636, 639 (Ch. 1940); In re Chodikoff's Will, 50 Misc. 2d 86, 87-88, 270 N.Y.S.2d
175, 178 (Sur. Ct. 1966); In re Estate of Storrs, 18 Misc. 2d 941, 944, 186 N.Y.S.2d 423, 426
(Sur. Ct. 1959); In re Ericson's Will, 138 N.Y.S.2d 252, 253-54 (Sur. Ct. 1954); Raines v.
Osborne, 184 N.C. 599, 602, 114 S.E. 849, 850 (1922); Miller v. Smith, 179 Or. 214, 219, 170
P.2d 583, 585 (1946); Maxwell v. Maxwell, 12 Wash. 2d 589, 597, 123 P.2d 335, 339 (1942).
69. See Hauck, 153 Ind. App. at 261-62, 286 N.E.2d at 862.
70. See Carr v. Dunn, 384 So. 2d 7, 9 (Ala. 1980); Kimbrough v. Dickinson, 247 Ala. 324,
327, 24 So. 2d 424, 426 (1946); In re Estate of Casey, 128 Cal. App. 3d 867, 872, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 170, 172 (1982); In re Estate of Webb, 76 Cal. App. 3d 169, 174, 142 Cal. Rptr. 642, 645
(1977); In re Estate of Wochos, 23 Cal. App. 3d 47, 53, 99 Cal. Rptr. 782, 785 (1972); Conroy
v. State, 240 So. 2d 172, 175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Indianapolis Home for the Aged, Inc.
1990]
Catholic University Law Review
evidence gave precise and explicit meaning to the language used by the de-
ceased, and could even include evidence of the testator's direct statements of
intent.7 For example, either the testator's oral declarations or the scriv-
ener's explanations could be admitted if a latent ambiguity presented a ques-
tion regarding the identity of a beneficiary,7 2 the identity of ambiguously
described property, 3 the testator's state of mind,74 or the testator's feelings
toward the claimants under his estate.75
Some courts delineated a third category of ambiguity, called an equivoca-
tion, while other courts treated equivocation as a type of latent ambiguity.
For example, if an accurate description in a will applied equally to persons of
the same name or to things of the same description, an equivocation re-
sulted. Only then could extrinsic evidence of the testator's direct statements
v. Altenheim, 120 Ind. App. 595, 601, 93 N.E.2d 203, 205 (1950); Widney v. Hess, 242 Iowa
342, 352, 45 N.W.2d 233, 239 (1950); Barnes v. Johns, 261 Ky. 181, 184, 87 S.W.2d 387, 389
(1935); In re Morrissey, 684 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Borah v. Lincoln Hosp.
Ass'n, 153 Neb. 846,46 N.W.2d 166 (1951); In re Estate of Klein, 434 N.W.2d 560, 561 (N.D.
1989); In re Estate of Thomas, 457 Pa. 546, 551, 327 A.2d 31, 34 (1974).
71. In re Estate of Carter, 47 Cal. 2d 200, 207-08, 302 P.2d 301, 307 (1956); In re Estate
of McDonald, 191 Cal. App. 2d 565, 570, 12 Cal. Rptr. 823, 826 (1961); In re Estate of Nunes,
123 Cal. App. 2d 150, 155, 266 P.2d 574, 579-80 (1954); Scheridan v. Scheridan, 132 Ga. App.
210, 210, 207 S.E.2d 691, 692 (1974); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 327 I1. 85, 88, 158 N.E. 356,
358 (1927); Breckheimer v. Kraft, 133 Il. App. 2d 410, 415, 273 N.E.2d 468, 472 (1971); In re
Estate of Sayewich, 120 N.H. 237, 242, 413 A.2d 581, 584 (1980); In re Bracalello's Will, 7
A.D.2d 1022, 1022, 184 N.YS.2d 459, 460 (1959); In re Estate of McKenna, 340 Pa. Super.
105, 114, 489 A.2d 862, 867 (1985); In re Estate of Kugler, 52 Wis. 2d 532, 536-37, 190
N.W.2d 883, 886 (1971); In re Estate of Mangel, 51 Wis. 2d 55, 67-69, 186 N.W.2d 276, 283
(1971); In re Estate of Breese, 7 Wis. 2d 422, 426, 96 N.W.2d 712, 717 (1959).
72. See, e.g., In re Estate of Glow, 208 Cal. App. 2d 613, 616-17, 25 Cal. Rptr. 416, 418
(1962); Evans v. Volunteers of Am., 280 S.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Mo. 1955); In re Estate of Thiem, 59
Misc. 2d 1032, 301 N.Y.S.2d 684 (Sur. Ct. 1969); Hultquist v. Ring, 301 S.W.2d 303, 307 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1957).
73. See, e.g., Moore v. Parrish, 38 Wash. 2d 642, 645-46, 228 P.2d 142, 144 (1951).
74. See, e.g., In re Estate of Fries, 221 Cal. App. 2d 725, 727, 34 Cal. Rptr. 749, 753
(1963).
75. See, e.g., Calder v. Bryant, 282 Mass. 231, 184 N.E. 440 (1933) (evidence of testator's
dislike of spouse's relatives admitted to show testator's intent that no property pass to them
under will). There are also a few cases permitting evidence of the testator's oral declarations of
intent for other reasons. See, e.g., Stappas v. Stappas, 271 Ala. 138, 142, 122 So. 2d 393, 395-
96 (1960) (testator's attorney permitted to testify regarding testator's communications to him
regarding execution of will); Odens v. Veen, 234 Iowa 1029, 14 N.W.2d 705 (1944) (testimony
of scrivener admitted because no objection raised); Rausch v. Libby, 132 N.J. Eq. 527, 531, 29
A.2d 378, 381 (Ch. 1942) (same); In re Rodgers' Estate, 374 Pa. 246, 251-52, 97 A.2d 789, 791
(1953) (testator's expressions of intent to revoke trust permitted). Such evidence could even
include testimony of the draftsman about the testator's intentions. See In re Katich, 565
S.W.2d 468, 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). These cases are highly atypical, however. According to
some commentators, direct statements of the testator were widely allowed in will construction
cases in the 1700's, while the rule against their use hardened in the 1800's. See Warren, Inter-
pretation of Wills-Recent Developments, 49 HARV. L. REV. 689, 706 (1936).
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of intention be admitted.7 6 Those courts that recognized latent ambiguity as
a broad category included not only equivocations, but also the situation
where no person or thing exactly fit a description in the will, yet two or more
persons or things partially answered the description. 7 In any case, when
dealing with a latent ambiguity or an equivocation, courts usually admitted
extrinsic evidence to supplement and even vary the language of a will. The
nature of the evidence offered to show the testator's intent, rather than the
type of mistake or ambiguity, was often the determining factor.78
Many courts have relaxed these rigid rules regarding the admissibility of
extrinsic evidence in will construction cases. For example, some jurisdic-
tions have repudiated the plain meaning rule.79 In addition, several jurisdic-
tions have abandoned the distinction between latent and patent ambiguities
for purposes of determining whether extrinsic evidence can be heard, and
hold that extrinsic evidence may be admitted to resolve either type of ambi-
guity.80 Other jurisdictions have even provided by statute for the admission
of extrinsic evidence to correct an ambiguity.8' Some jurisdictions, however,
still refuse to permit the testator's direct statements of intent, except in cases
of a latent ambiguity82 or equivocation.83
76. See, e.g., Kaufhold v. McIver, 682 S.W.2d 660, 665 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); T. ATKIN-
SON, supra note 2, § 60, at 287; 4 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 32.9, at 271
(1960 & Cum. Supp. 1988); Comment, Wills--Interpretation-Revoked Will as Admissible Evi-
dence, 46 MICH. L. REV. 583, 584 (1948).
77. See, e.g., In re Estate of Morrissey, 684 S.W.2d 876, 878-79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); In re
Estate of Gibbs, 14 Wis. 2d 490, 496, 111 N.W.2d 413, 417 (1961); see also Bartels v. Bartels, I
Ohio Op. 2d 110, 112, 139 N.E.2d 695, 699 (1956) (where will identified legatee as testatrix's
brother but named testatrix's nephew instead, evidence admitted to show testatrix intended
property to pass to brother).
78. See, e.g., Breckner v. Prestwood, 600 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). This seems
relevant to the situation involving a mistake by a scrivener. See In re Will of Goldstein, 46
A.D.2d 449, 451, 363 N.Y.S.2d 147, 149 (1975), affid, 38 N.Y.2d 876, 346 N.E.2d 544, 382
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1976).
79. See. e.g., In re Estate of Russell, 69 Cal. 2d 200, 444 P.2d 353, 70 Cal. Rptr. 561
(1968); Comment, Wills-Construction, supra note 55, at 1261.
80. See In re Estate of White, 9 Cal. App. 3d 194, 201, 87 Cal. Rptr. 881, 884-85 (1970);
In re Estate of Mohr, 7 Cal. App. 3d 641, 646-47, 86 Cal. Rptr. 731, 734 (1970); In re Estate of
Gibson, 19 11. App. 3d 550, 553, 312 N.E. 1, 3 (1974); Anderson v. Dubel, 580 S.W.2d 404,
408 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); 4 W. PAGE, LAW OF WILLS § 327, at 258-59 (Bowe-Parker ed.
1961); 3 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY §§ 241-248 (1940); J. THAYER, A PRELIMI-
NARY TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 435 (1898); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2472, at
243 (3d ed. 1940); Carr, supra note 17, at 411; Smith, supra note 55, at 124; Comment, Admis-
sibility of Parol Evidence to Explain Ambiguities in Wills, 42 KY. L.J. 692, 695 (1954); Com-
ment, Wills-Admission of Extrinsic Evidence to Explain Ambiguities in Wills, 35 N.C.L. REV.
167, 171 (1956).
81. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-94 (1982 & Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84,
§ 174 (West 1970 & Supp. 1987).
82. See In re Carvalho's Will, 57 N.Y.S.2d 307, 310 (Sur. Ct. 1944).
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In courts where most relevant evidence is admissible, testimony of the
scrivener regarding the testator's intentions is permitted to resolve an ambi-
guity,84 or even to correct a mistake in draftsmanship.85 The California
courts were among the first state courts to permit a scrivener's testimony to
resolve a latent ambiguity in a will.86 They also permit extrinsic evidence
(excluding the oral declarations of the testator) to resolve such ambiguities
with the aid of a relevant statute.87 Courts in California have even called for
legislation to admit all relevant evidence, including the testator's oral decla-
rations, to help resolve any ambiguity in a will.88
Thus, the rules regarding the admissibility of extrinsic evidence in will
construction cases have broadened considerably over the last several years.
This relaxation of evidentiary rules has significant implications for reforma-
tion in mistake cases involving scriveners' errors. If extrinsic evidence can
be admitted to clarify an uncertain provision in a will, even at the risk of
altering what appears to be the intent of the language on the written page,
then clear and convincing proof of such evidence should allow the correction
of a mistake of omission. Although construction is not considered reforma-
tion, the end result is sometimes the same.89
This idea is perhaps best illustrated by the development of a construc-
tional rule which the courts of New Jersey have fashioned over the past
83. See Baliles v. Miller, 231 Va. 48, 57, 340 S.E.2d 805, 811 (1986); Note, Admissibility of
Testator's Declarations of Intention, 17 S.C.L. REV. 276, 282 (1965).
84. See, e.g., In re Estate of Katich, 565 S.W.2d 468, 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); In re
Estate of Bergau, 103 Wash. 2d 431, 436, 693 P.2d 703, 705-06 (1985).
85. See, e.g., In re Estate of Anderson, 359 N.W.2d 479, 481 (Iowa 1984).
86. See In re Estate of Dominici, 151 Cal. 181, 90 P. 448 (1907); In re Estate of Taff, 63
Cal. App. 3d 319, 325, 133 Cal. Rptr. 737, 741 (1976) (extrinsic evidence of testator's written
and oral declarations to drafting attorney admissible to show what testator intended by use of
term "heirs"). See generally In re Estate of De Moulin, 101 Cal. App. 2d 221, 224-25, 225
P.2d 303, 306 (1950) (admission of scrivener's testimony that she inadvertently omitted words
from typed version of will overruled); Comment, Wills-Construction, supra note 55 (evidence
of relationship between testator and beneficiary admitted to show intent of testator).
87. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 105 (West 1956). The provision states:
When there is an imperfect description, or no person or property exactly answers
the description, mistakes and omissions must be corrected, if the error appears from
the context of the will or from extrinsic evidence, excluding the oral declarations of
the testator as to his intentions; and when an uncertainty arises upon the face of a
will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be
ascertained from the words of the will, taking into view the circumstances under
which it was made, excluding such oral declarations.
Id.
88. See In re Estate of Kime, 144 Cal. App. 3d 246, 261-62, 193 Cal. Rptr. 718, 731
(1983). Not all courts have concurred. See, e.g., In re Estate of Kelly, 473 Pa. 48, 54-55, 373
A.2d 744, 747 (1977).
89. See infra text accompanying notes 102-40.
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several years. To carry out the true intent of the testator, New Jersey courts
will open a will to interpretation, even if unambiguous on its face,' and
admit any extrinsic evidence, including direct statements of intention of the
testator,9t when a contingency occurs that is not specifically provided for in
the will. Such evidence is admitted as part of the factual circumstances sur-
rounding the testator and his dispositive scheme. 92 Even though applying
this doctrine of "probable intent" means departing from the literal terms of
the will and supplying a missing gap in the will's provisions, the doctrine
enables a court to correct mistakes or omissions in a will, including those of
the scrivener, in order to carry out the intent of the testator.9 3 The New
Jersey doctrine of probable intent is now codified by statute.94 Once the
literal terms of a will become subject to alteration, it is only a small jump to
allow reformation for scriveners' mistakes. Indeed, construction in these
probable intent cases practically replaces reformation.
The trend toward the abolition of dead man's statutes is another area
where the rules concerning the admission of extrinsic evidence have been
recently relaxed. This is significant when applied to will construction cases,
and in turn has an impact on proposed reformation for scriveners' errors.
At common law, a person was not permitted to testify at trial concerning
any conversation or interaction he may have had with the deceased. 95 A
90. See Wilson v. Flowers, 58 N.J. 250, 277 A.2d 199 (1971). Extrinsic evidence "should
be admitted first to show if there is an ambiguity and second, if one exists, to shed light on the
testator's actual intent." See id. at 263, 277 A.2d at 207.
91. See In re Estate of Cook, 44 N.J. 1, 206 A.2d 865 (1965). This rule is contrary to that
of most jurisdictions, where direct statements are traditionally excluded on grounds of unrelia-
bility. See 4 W. PAGE, supra note 17, § 32.7, at 254, § 33.9, at 305.
92. See Engle v. Siegel, 74 N.J. 287, 377 A.2d 892 (1977) (admissible extrinsic evidence
included draftsman's testimony of what testator desired); Darpino v. D'Arpino, 73 N.J. Super.
262, 179 A.2d 527 (App. Div. 1962) (oral testimony of draftsman admitted to show what a
term in will meant). The rule apparently does not apply to direct statements of intent if the
declaration goes to a provision specifically covered in the will. See In re Estate of Hoffman, 53
N.J. Super. 396, 147 A.2d 545 (App. Div. 1959).
93. See Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Robert, 36 N.J. 561, 568, 178 A.2d 185, 189 (1962),
modifying on other grounds 67 N.J. Super. 564, 171 A.2d 348 (App. Div. 1961). The court in
Robert ascribed "impulses which are common to human nature" to the testator to decide what
he would have done had he anticipated the problem. Id. at 565, 171 A.2d at 187. (Both the
Cook and Robert decisions ignored the plain meaning rule to ascertain the testator's subjective
intent.). The standard of proof is one of clear and convincing evidence. See also In re Estate of
Ericson, 74 N.J. 300, 377 A.2d 898 (1977) (despite inadvertent addition to will, testator's
intent to maximize marital deduction and minimize estate taxes prevailed).
94. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-33 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987). Most jurisdictions, how-
ever, do not follow the New Jersey approach. See, e.g., In re Estate of Casey, 128 Cal. App. 3d
867, 198 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1982); In re Estate of Macfarlane, 313 Pa. Super. 397, 459 A.2d 1289
(1983); In re Estate of Connolly, 65 Wis. 2d 440, 222 N.W.2d 885 (1974).
95. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-201 (Smith-Hurd 1984), which states in
relevant part:
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majority of states, however, have recently either repealed, abrogated, or
modified the common law rule to give courts more flexibility in admitting
relevant, credible evidence when ascertaining the true nature of the transac-
tion between the testator and a third party (usually a creditor).96 This trend
is in line with the opinions of most commentators, who have repeatedly
called for the abolition of such statutes.97 In addition, the Federal Rules of
Evidence reject the principle of the dead man's statutes.98 The fact that dead
man's statutes are usually inapplicable to proceedings to probate a will
places courts in a better position to determine whether the testator has pres-
ent testamentary intent, which, after all, is the purpose of a will probate
proceeding.99 This same reasoning applies by analogy to cases of scriveners'
errors. Ascertaining the testator's intent after probate should also be para-
mount. As long as clear proof of such intent is forthcoming, a mistake
should not be allowed to take precedence over that intent.
In the trial of any action in which any party sues or defends as the representative of a
deceased person ... no adverse party or person directly interested in the action shall
be allowed to testify on his or her own behalf to any conversation with the deceased
... or to any event which took place in the presence of the deceased ....
Some jurisdictions permit exceptions to the rule if one side or the other does introduce such
evidence. See, e.g., id. at para. 8-102(a).
96. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-172 (1983) (abrogated); IOWA CODE § 622.4 (1946)
(repealed 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 65 (amended 1941) (abrogated); MINN.
STAT. § 595.04 (1946) (repealed 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 93-701-3(3) (1947) (repealed
1973); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3716 (Vernon 1926) (repealed 1981); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1602 (1961) (modified); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-397 (1950) (modified).
97. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 65, at 159 (3d ed. 1984); 2 J. WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 578, at 819-20 (3d ed. 1979); Ladd, Admission of Evidence Against Estates
of Deceased Persons, 19 IOWA L. REV. 521 (1933); Maguire, Witnesses-Suppression of Testi-
mony by Reason of Death, 6 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1957).
98. See FED. R. EVID. 601. Direct statements of a decedent have been admissible under
New Jersey Rules of Evidence 63(12)(a) and 63(32) (1987) for some time, having interesting
ramifications for New Jersey's doctrine of probable intent. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-
2 (West 1952), amended by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-2 (West Supp. 1971) (elimination of
Dead Man's Act as bar to receiving evidence).
99. One other instance where extrinsic evidence often may be used to correct a mistake is
where a claimant attempts to prove the contents of a will that has been inadvertently lost or
mutilated before the death of the testator. See, e.g., In re Estate of Parker, 382 So. 2d 652, 653
(Fla. 1980); In re Estate of Crozier, 232 N.W.2d 554, 556 (Iowa 1975); In re Breckwoldt's
Will, 170 Misc. 883, 886, 11 N.Y.S.2d 486, 489 (Sur. Ct. 1939); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2107.26 (Anderson 1953). In this situation, clear and convincing evidence may be used to
prove the contents of the will. See, e.g., Conkle v. Walker, 294 Ark. 222, 225, 742 S.W.2d 892,
894 (1988); Shrum v. Powell, 604 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-2228 (1939); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.20.070 (1967). Many jurisdictions even allow
the testator's oral declarations to be used as corroborative proof of the will's contents. See,
e.g., Cantway v. Cantway, 315 I11. 244, 250, 146 N.E. 148, 149 (1925); Loy v. Loy, 246 S.W.2d
578, 579 (Ky. 1952); Miller v. Miller, 285 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
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IV. CORRECTING SCRIVENERS' MISTAKES UNDER THE GUISE OF
TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE
Although seldom noticed or labelled as such, there are numerous excep-
tions to the "no reformation for mistake" rule-situations where extrinsic
evidence is already admissible in will contests to correct the mistakes of the
testator or the scrivener. These exceptions are usually matters of established
doctrine in the law of wills. Surprisingly, however, few courts or commenta-
tors have focused on them as analogies to support the argument favoring a
remedy for scriveners' mistakes in wills."° Those areas where mistakes in
wills can be corrected either by traditional doctrine or under the label of
construction include the personal usage exception to the plain meaning rule,
the precept offalsa demonstratio non nocet, the principle of dependent rela-
tive revocation, and the doctrine of gifts by implication. In addition, courts
may remedy a mistaken belief by the testator by calling it an insane delusion.
Further, pretermission statutes often limit the extent to which a mistake
about a child can interfere with the testator's true intent. Finally, judicial
and statutory reforms under the Rule against Perpetuities also prevent mis-
takes from disrupting a will's dispositive scheme. All of these doctrines have
one thing in common-they were created to give effect to the true intent of
the testator, despite the technical and formalistic obstacles that often stand
in the way. Even though reformation often occurs in the application of these
doctrines, courts seldom speak in terms of reformation when applying them.
Not surprisingly, most of these doctrines require proof of a clear and con-
vincing nature, which is one way to ensure that such corrections are care-
fully considered by the court before being made.
Courts also routinely permit corrections when there are errors in punctua.-
tion or grammar in a will. These kinds of mistakes are generally not control-
ling, and corrections may be made if they clarify the meaning of the will.'
Even though courts view such errors as de minimis, grammar and punctua-
tion especially may be crucial to the intended meaning of a will provision. If
these kinds of mistakes can be reformed, then a scrivener's error, which is
considerably closer to a grammatical or punctuation error than a substantive
error, should also be reformed.
100. With respect to mistake in general, one notable exception is Langbein and Waggoner.
See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 6, at 535-49.
101. See, e.g., Scott v. Powell, 182 F.2d 75, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1950); In re Estate of Lewis, 91
Cal. App. 2d 322, 325, 204 P.2d 898, 900 (1949); Mercantile Trust & Say. Bank v. Rogers, 5
Ill. App. 2d 162, 170, 124 N.E.2d 683, 687 (1955); Nolan v. Easley, 214 Miss. 190, 198, 58 So.
2d 491, 493 (1952); First Methodist Church v. Pennock, 130 N.J. Eq. 452. 455, 22 A.2d 889,
891 (1941); In re Estate of Potolsky, 9 Misc. 2d 326, 327, 169 N.Y.S.2d 328, 327 (Sur. Ct.
1957); In re Walker's Estate, 376 Pa. 16, 18, 101 A.2d 652, 655 (1954).
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A. The Personal Usage Exception
As stated previously, the personal usage exception is one way that courts
have tempered the results of the plain meaning rule. Traditionally, the
words in a will had to be given their customary and usual meaning ("plain
meaning") even though the testator may not have intended that particular
meaning to apply. The personal usage exception allows courts to give effect
to the testator's personal vocabulary and permits extrinsic evidence to show
that the deceased habitually used certain words or phrases idiosyncrati-
cally.' °2 The personal usage exception is one way courts prevent mistaken
interpretations of words in a will from having any effect on its provisions.
The exception to the plain meaning rule, however, is seldom viewed as a
correction or reformation; instead, it is viewed as construction. From a
functional viewpoint, though, there is little difference between permitting the
written words to mean something else and correcting an outright error in a
will. Only the rigid "no reformation for mistake" rule prevents courts from
labelling the personal usage exception for what it is-a method of correcting
the meaning of written words so that the actual intent of the testator is fol-
lowed. If courts allow the testator's personal usage of a word or phrase,
which contradicts the written word in the will, then courts should also admit
extrinsic evidence of scriveners' errors. These errors are less dangerous from
an evidentiary perspective.
B. Falsa Demonstratio Non Nocet
The doctrine offalsa demonstratio non nocet is another area where certain
types of corrections are customarily permitted in wills, despite the general
rule of "no reformation for mistake." The principle of falsa demonstratio
prevents a false description in a will from vitiating the document. For exam-
ple, if someone or something is described accurately in part, but incorrectly
in other ways, the doctrine allows the false part of the description to be
rejected if the part that is true describes the person or thing with reasonable
certainty. 103 Courts are much less hostile to crossing out language in a will
than they are to adding words to the instrument. For one thing, eliminating
102. See. e.g., In re Estate of Gehl, 39 Wis. 2d 206, 211, 159 N.W.2d 72, 74-75 (1968);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 241 comment a, § 242 comment d (1940); T. ATKIN-
SON, supra note 2, § 60, at 285-86, § 146, at 810; see also First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Baker, 124 Conn. 577, 1 A.2d 283 (1938) (customary meaning of word is accepted rule of
interpretation, unless testator's unusual use of word is clearly indicated from examining entire
will).
103. See, e.g., Patch v. White, 117 U.S. 210, 216-17 (1886); Appleton v. Rea, 389 I11. 222,
227, 58 N.E.2d 854, 857 (1945); Vestal v. Garrett, 197 I1l. 398, 400-01, 64 N.E. 345, 346-47
(1902); Breckheimer v. Kraft, 133 Ill. App. 2d 410, 273 N.E.2d 468 (1971); T. ATKINSON,
supra note 2, § 60, at 283; see also Guardian, Trust & Ex'rs Co. v. Inwood, 1946 N.Z.L.R. 614
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a word or phrase does not directly contravene any testamentary formalities,
while inserting an unattested word or phrase does. The doctrine of falsa
demonstratio thus allows certain kinds of mistakes to be corrected under the
guise of traditional construction doctrine rather than reformation. Regard-
less of its label, the process and the final result are the same. The same
treatment could also be given to scriveners' errors, allowing for their dele-
tion if the rest of the will could stand alone. In both cases, the purpose of
the testator is frustrated unless the deletion is made. If certain substantive
errors can be corrected under this theory, then why not scriveners' mistakes?
Scriveners' mistakes should, at a minimum, also be subject to correction
under the doctrine of falsa demonstratio non nocet.
C Dependent Relative Revocation
Dependent relative revocation (DRR) is another exception to the "no ref-
ormation for mistake" rule. This doctrine traditionally comes into play
when a testator executes one will and thereafter attempts to revoke it by
making a testamentary disposition that proves ineffective.'"' The doctrine
can apply in other situations as well-for example, when a testator alters an
executed will by crossing out some terms and adding new ones,"0 5 or when
the testator is mistaken about the death of a beneficiary, and crosses out that
person's name to substitute another name."° 6 In these situations, many
courts hold that the revocation of the second will, or will provision, is condi-
tional on its ultimate validity and relative to the mistaken assumption upon
which the revocation depended.'0 7 Thus, many courts reason that the ear-
lier will or provision can stand only if the sole alternative is intestacy.'0°
(C.A. 1946) (where two sisters accidentally signed each other's identical will, court granted
probate by omitting the incorrect name to give effect to intent of testatrix).
104. See Briscoe v. Allison, 200 Tenn. 115, 120, 290 S.W.2d 864, 866 (1956). The doctrine
is also applicable when a testator makes a second will which revokes a first, and then destroys
the later one, incorrectly thinking that the earlier document will be brought back to life. Es-
tate of Auburn, 18 Wis. 2d 340, 118 N.W.2d 919 (1963).
105. See, e.g., In re Pratt, 88 So. 2d 499, 501 (Fla. 1956).
106. See generally T. ATKINSON, supra note 2, § 88, at 453 (dependent relative revocation
occurs when testator's revocation is induced by mistake, such as whether a beneficiary is still
alive).
107. See Larrick v. Larrick, 271 Ark. 120, 124, 607 S.W.2d 92, 95 (Ct. App. 1980). With
respect to the revocation of a later will, both the earlier one and the later one must reflect
similar dispositive plans. See. e.g., In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Estate of Ten-
nant, 220 Mont. 78, 89-90, 714 P.2d 122, 129 (1986).
108. In the case of two wills, sometimes the later will is held to be effective, especially if the
jurisdiction follows the "no revival of revoked wills" rule. Thus, in some jurisdictions, if an
earlier will is revoked by a subsequent instrument, it cannot be revived under any circum-
stances. Compare In re Estate of Eberhardt, I Wis. 2d 439, 440, 85 N.W.2d 483, 484 (1957)
(doctrine of dependent relative revocation can never be applied to revive a will that has been
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The doctrine of DRR has been applied to cases where the revocation is by
physical act or by execution of a subsequent instrument. Extrinsic evidence
of the testator's intent is admissible in these cases to show what the testator
would have wanted had he known the legal effect of his actions."°9 The
presumed intent of the testator is that, if he has executed a will, he does not
intend to die intestate.
Dependent relative revocation allows mistaken assumptions regarding the
revocation of a will, or one of its provisions, to be corrected. Courts usually
admit parol evidence here, but not for mistakes in the execution of a will
unless the will itself shows the mistaken belief. The different treatment is
perhaps a result of two factors: (1) if the revocation is by physical act, then
no physical evidence of an alternative disposition could ever be found on the
face of the document because it has been destroyed;" 0 and (2) if the revoca-
tion is by subsequent instrument, the written words normally evidence a
failed alternative plan of disposition. Protection against unreliable extrinsic
evidence is preserved in both situations by requiring that the proof of mis-
take be clear and convincing. The extrinsic evidence usually consists of a
duly executed will and the scrivener's testimony of what happened, or even
the oral declarations of the testator."' When viewed in this light, scriven-
ers' errors should also be subject to correction. Reformation to correct an
invalid revocation may contradict far more Statute of Wills' formalities (rev-
ocation statute) than does reformation to correct a scrivener's error. In ad-
dition, the kind of extrinsic evidence needed to correct a scrivener's mistake
would be similar to that needed for dependent relative revocation. Again,
clear and convincing evidence would be required to prove a scrivener's
error."
2
D. Gifts by Implication
Courts correct mistakes in wills without acknowledging the implications
of their actions when they imply a gift to a beneficiary, even though the
previously validly revoked) with Stewart v. Johnson, 142 Fla. 425, 194 So. 869 (1940) (when a
testator revokes a will and his second will is later found to be invalid, the first will may be
reestablished).
109. See, e.g., Crosby v. Alton Ochsner Medical Found., 276 So. 2d 661 (Miss. 1973).
110. In addition, extrinsic evidence is necessary to determine whether the revocation by
physical act was accompanied by the requisite intention to revoke. See Langbein & Waggoner,
supra note 6, at 545.
111. See Carter v. First United Methodist Church, 246 Ga. 352, 355, 271 S.E.2d 493, 497
(1980).
112. If the scrivener's error resulted in an omission, however, some courts would not be
able to give a remedy by analogy to DRR. See, e.g., In re Estate of Barker, 448 So. 2d 28, 32
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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testator has not expressly specified that particular beneficiary or class of ben-
eficiaries as recipients of the gift. For a gift to be implied, the court must
come to an inescapable conclusion that the testator intended such a gift. As
one court explained:
"If a reading of the whole will produces a conviction that the testa-
tor must necessarily have intended an interest to be given which is
not bequeathed by express and formal words, the court may supply
the defect by implication, and so mould the language of the testa-
tor as to carry into effect, so far as possible, the intention which it
is of [the] opinion that he has on the whole will sufficiently
declared."' 13
Thus, an implied gift is often constructed when a reading of the will, includ-
ing its general scheme, the property involved, and the persons named as ben-
eficiaries, leads a court to believe that such a gift was intended." 4 Gifts by
implication are also raised when the testator, through error or omission, fails
to provide for a specific contingency which then occurs." 5
Even though many courts insist that a finding of a gift by implication
cannot be used as a way to correct a mistake by the testator or the drafts-
man, 16 the doctrine nevertheless results in reformation to reflect the testa-
tor's true intent. While it is argued that the only recourse to fill in an
omission by the testator is for a court to imply a gift,' the doctrine can
correct mistakes in faulty draftsmanship by the scrivener under the guise of
construction. " 18
Courts will also imply gifts of future interests to effectuate the presumed
intent of the testator. This commonly occurs when property is conveyed "to
B for life, and if B dies without issue, to C," and B dies survived by issue.
According to the Restatement (First) of Property, an inference can be drawn
that the transferor has created an interest in favor of B's issue.' 9 Another
113. See Wing v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., N.A., 301 N.C. 456, 463-64, 272 S.E.2d 90,
96 (1980) (quoting Burcham v. Burcham, 219 N.C. 357, 359, 13 S.E.2d 615, 616 (1941)).
114. See Brock v. Hall, 33 Cal. 2d 885, 887-88, 206 P.2d 360, 363 (1949); Alfau v. Miller,
306 Mass. 572, 576, 29 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1940); McMurtrie v. McMurtrie, 15 N.J.L. 276 (Sup. Ct.
1836); In re Englis' Will, 2 N.Y.2d 395, 402-03, 141 N.E.2d 556, 559, 161 N.Y.S.2d 39, 43-44
(1957); In re Dorson's Estate, 22 Misc. 2d 945, 947-48, 196 N.Y.S.2d 344, 346-47 (Sur. Ct.
1959). See generally 4 W. PAGE, LAW OF WILLS § 30.18, at 119 (Bowe-Parker ed. 1961)
(testator may dispose of property, not by formal disposition in will, but by necessary implica-
tion considering the will as a whole).
115. See In re Estate of Koellner, 121 A.D.2d 838, 839, 504 N.Y.S.2d 572, 573 (1986).
116. See In re Estate of MacLean, 47 Wis. 2d 396, 405-06, 177 N.W.2d 874, 879 (1970).
117. See In re Trust of Pauly, 71 Wis. 2d 306, 310, 237 N.W.2d 719, 721 (1976).
118. See Re Main, [1947] 1 All E.R. 255 (Ch.); Comment, Gift Implied in Inter Vivos
Transfer-A New Setting for a Familiar Result, 2 STAN. L. REV. 226, 227 (1949).
119. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 272 (1940).
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situation where courts will imply gifts of a future interest occurs when a
testator bequeaths a fund in trust "to pay the income to A, B, and C for their
lives, and at their death to pay the principal to D." If A dies, what happens
to A's share of the income? Many courts hold that there are implied cross-
remainders to the surviving life tenants. In other words, the cross-remainder
in A's one-third share would read as follows: "to A for life, then, as to one-
half of this share to B for life, then to C for life; and as to the other one-half
of this share to C for life, then to B for life." Similar cross-remainders would
be implied for B's share and C's share. 20 Finally, some courts have implied
gifts of a life estate to a beneficiary when there are words in a will that
indicate an intent to give the life use to that person, even though there is no
evidence of an express gift of the property's use to the person at whose death
the remainder takes effect.' 2 ' In all of these situations, courts are remedying
the effects of poor drafting, which can include scriveners' errors.
Although courts "imply" gifts in wills in several other situations as well,
they rarely admit exactly what they are doing. For instance, the New Jersey
courts imply bequests under the doctrine of probable intent. 122 Other courts
may imply gifts from precatory language. 23  Still others imply invasion
powers in a life tenant, 24 or imply a general gift to charity when a gift to a
particular charity fails (doctrine of cy pres). '25 All of these "implied" gifts
are evidence that courts can add provisions to a will to correct errors even
though they formally reject reformation as an appropriate remedy for mis-
take (including that of a scrivener). If courts are willing to imply gifts based
upon a reading of the whole will, they should correct scriveners' errors based
upon the tenor of the entire will as well.
120. See generally Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Harvey, 143 Conn. 233, 238-39, 121
A.2d 276, 280-81 (1956) (where testator's intent would be defeated, court can imply cross-
remainders where two people are given a tenancy in common in a life estate, but no provision
is made regarding the right of one at the death of the other to enjoy the other's income);
Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Hartford Hosp., 141 Conn. 163, 171, 104 A.2d 356, 360
(1954) (where no express cross-remainder and terms of will did not imply otherwise, property
passed intestate after death of beneficiary); Hunt v. Mitchell, 409 Ill. 321, 324, 99 N.E.2d 347,
349 (1951) (where no cross-remainder to surviving sibling, children of deceased sibling were
entitled to land held as against surviving sibling or aunt); In re Brahaney's Will, 46 Misc. 2d
901, 905, 261 N.Y.S.2d 517, 522 (Sur. Ct. 1965) (cross remainders by implication are allowed
only when intention of testator cannot be found in will).
121. See Phoenix State Bank & Trust Co. v. Johnson, 132 Conn. 259, 264-65, 43 A.2d 738,
740 (1945).
122. See supra text accompanying note 94.
123. See, e.g., Cickyj v. Skeltinska, 93 Il. App. 3d 556, 417 N.E.2d 699 (1981) (dictum).
124. See, e.g., In re Wolcott, 95 N.H. 23, 27-28, 56 A.2d 641, 644 (1948).




Courts are also willing to minimize the effect of a mistake in a will when
the error consists of a mistaken belief by the testator created by an insane
delusion. When present testamentary capacity is impaired by an insane de-
lusion, the part of the will that was caused by the delusion fails.' 26
Although an insane delusion differs from a mistake in that a mistake is cor-
rectable if the testator is told the truth,'27 invalidating the provision of the
will affected by a delusion is one way in which courts remedy a mistaken
belief by the testator, usually concerning a member of his family.' Extrin-
sic evidence is admissible in these cases to prove that the testator lacked
testamentary capacity.' 29 If extrinsic evidence is permitted to eliminate the
effect of a delusion on a substantive provision of a will, such evidence should
be allowed to prove the existence of a scrivener's mistake, which also impairs
the testator's true intent. In appropriate cases, the court could then strike
the offending provision from the will.
F Pretermission
At common law, a child omitted from his parent's will had no recourse.
Legislatures remedied this situation in part with pretermission statutes,
which were originally designed to prevent the unintentional disinheritance of
children by the testator. 1 30 These statutes eventually took one of two forms.
The Massachusetts type of statute provides that an omitted child shall be
entitled to an intestate heir's portion of the testator's estate unless it appears
that the omission was intentional.13" ' The Missouri type of statute provides
that a child shall be given an intestate heir's share of the estate if he is not
mentioned in the will.' 32 Under the Massachusetts type of statute, extrinsic
evidence is admissible to show that the omission was intentional.' 33 Under
126. Present testamentary capacity is a prerequisite to executing a valid will. If the entire
will was caused by the insane delusion, the entire will fails. See generally T. ATKINSON, supra
note 2, § 52, at 243-44 (delusion affecting entire will vitiates testamentary capacity).
127. See, e.g., Dixon v. Webster, 551 S.W.2d 888, 893 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
128. See, e.g., In re City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 518, 144 A.2d 338 (1958); In
re Dovci's Estate, 174 Pa. Super. 266, 101 A.2d 449 (1953); In re Will of-Riemer, 2 Wis. 2d 16,
85 N.W.2d 804 (1957).
129. See, e.g., In re Estate of Camin, 212 Neb. 490, 503-04, 323 N.W.2d 827, 840 (1982).
130. Some statutes protect issue or heirs instead.
131. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-302 (West 1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-06-
02 (2-302) (1975).
132. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-9-210 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551.10
(1989).
133. See, e.g., In re Estate of Uliscni, 372 N.W.2d 759, 762-63 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); In re
Estate of Jones v. Jones, 759 P.2d 345, 349-50 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); In re Will of Mattes, 268
Wis. 447, 451, 68 N.W.2d 18, 21 (1955).
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the Missouri type of statute, extrinsic evidence is usually inadmissible to
show that the testator intended to disinherit an omitted child. 134 The mod-
ern trend, however, is to consider intent in both situations.1 35 The Uniform
Probate Code also gives relief where the testator fails to provide for a living
child in his will solely because he mistakenly believes the child to be dead. 1
36
In addition, one jurisdiction has adopted the rule that a will may be re-
formed for a mistake if the error concerns the existence or conduct of the
testator's heir at law.' 37 This is broader than the typical pretermission
statute.
Pretermission statutes generally attempt to remedy the effect of a possible
mistake by the testator concerning the exclusion of his children (or issue or
heirs) from his will. Even though the Massachusetts type of statute allows
extrinsic evidence to prove that the exclusion was not a mistake, it is signifi-
cant that extrinsic evidence is permitted to ascertain the actual intent of the
testator. If an omission in a will regarding the testator's children (or issue or
heirs) can be cured by legislative flat, then similar legislation should remedy
the omission created from a scrivener's error. It is a lesser jump toward
reformation to supply a gap in the will's disposition when the scrivener has
made a drafting mistake, as opposed to supplying an omission to a will be-
cause of a substantive error in failing to name a beneficiary. Scriveners' mis-
takes, which are not necessarily caused by the testator, are far more
deserving of correction than these substantive errors.
G. Reformation to Correct a Violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities
Nine states authorize outright reformation of a will provision by a court to
cure a perpetuities violation, either by statute 38 or judicial decision.' 39 This
134. See, e.g.. Armstrong v. Butler, 262 Ark. 31, 39, 553 S.W.2d 453, 458 (1977); In re
Estate of Cooke, 96 Idaho 48, 54, 524 P.2d 176, 181 (1973); In re Jackson, 117 N.H. 898, 903,
379 A.2d 832, 835 (1977).
135. See, e.g., Smith v. Crook, 160 Cal. App. 3d 245, 248, 206 Cal. Rptr. 524, 526 (1984);
Estate of Crump v. Freeman, 614 P.2d 1096, 1098 (Okla. 1980); Towne v. Cottrell, 236 Or.
151, 153, 387 P.2d 576, 577 (1963); see also Note, Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence to Show
Testator's Intention as to Omission of Provision for Child, 88 A.L.R.2D 616 (1963) (discusses
common law admissibility of extrinsic evidence of testator's intent under Massachusetts and
Missouri type statutes and other statutes).
136. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-302(b) (1983).
137. See GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-8 (Supp. 1982).
138. See, e.g., CAL.. CIv. CODE § 715.5 (West Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (1979);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 442.555 (Vernon Supp. 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 75-78 (West
Supp. 1981); see also Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 6, at 546 n.95 (statutes which allow for
reformation of will where violation of Rule Against Perpetuities).
139. Estate of Chun Quan Yee Hop, 52 Haw. 40, 469 P.2d 183 (1970); Carter v. Berry, 243
Miss. 321, 140 So. 2d 843 (1962); Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 467, 469, 474. 31 A. 900,
911, 913, 916 (1891); Berry v. Union Nat'l Bank, 164 W. Va. 258, 262 S.E.2d 766 (1980): see
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equitable modification or perpetuities-cy pres doctrine allows courts to cor-
rect a mistake made either by the testator, his attorney, or scrivener who has
unwittingly violated the Rule against Perpetuities. In jurisdictions where
this doctrine has been adopted by judicial decision, most of the courts have
candidly spoken of reformation."o If a court can reform a substantive will
provision by approximating the testator's intent to effectuate a gift, then a
scrivener's error should be reformed as well, especially when proved by clear
and convincing evidence. At the very least, by analogy to the perpetuities-cy
pres doctrine, a scrivener's error should be subject to correction, especially if
the mistake results in the frustration of the testator's intent and can be elimi-
nated by a cy pres interpretation to carry out such intent. Which kinds of
mistakes are deemed worthy of correction should not depend on exceptions
to the "no reformation for mistake" rule, but should follow from those argu-
ments justifying reformation for scriveners' errors.' 4 '
V. THE ARGUMENT REINFORCED: A COMPARISON TO REFORMATION
FOR INTER VIVOS INSTRUMENTS
A rule which allows reformation to correct a scrivener's error in a will
follows established principles of reformation for inter vivos instruments in
the areas of contract, property, and trust law. Each of these areas recognizes
that reformation of an instrument to correct a scrivener's mistake can take
place under certain circumstances. Because a scrivener's error is not a sub-
stantive one, and because will substitutes falling into the categories of con-
tract, deed, or trust instruments can also be reformed under inter vivos
reformation principles, it makes little sense to prohibit reformation for scriv-
eners' mistakes in wills.
After all, the distinction between will substitutes and testamentary instru-
ments is more one of form than of substance.'4 2 In addition, the traditional
also Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 6, at 546 (several jurisdictions apply express reforma-
tion doctrine to revise dispositions in wills that violate Rule Against Perpetuities). Five other
states allow courts to reduce to 21 age contingencies over 21 to save a gift from the Rule
against Perpetuities. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-96 (West 1981); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33, § 102 (1978); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-103(b) (1974); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 184A, § 2 (Law. Co-op. 1977); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUsTS LAW § 9-1.2 (McKin-
ney 1967); see also Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities." Ninety
Years in Limbo, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1070-71 (1987) (discussing New York legislation
authorizing courts to act to cure a perpetuities violation).
140. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 6, at 549. Both Langbein and Waggoner be-
lieve that the courts in Mississippi, Hawaii, and West Virginia have not explained how or why
the Statute of Wills permits such reformation. Id.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 28-51.
142. See also Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succes-
sion, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984) (describing major will substitutes, causes of decline in
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rationale for allowing reformation to a deed or contract, but not a will-
because the process of reformation is based upon the enforcement of an ex-
isting obligation between the parties, an idea which contradicts the donative
nature of a will' 4 3-- seems less persuasive since reformation virtually occurs
already in several areas of estate law.'" Further, courts will frequently re-
form deed or trust instruments for scriveners' errors at the request of the
transferor, provided the transferor of the property is a donor. Moreover, the
distinction between a deed and a will can sometimes become blurred when a
deed is presently executed, but is intended to take effect on the death of the
transferor, 145 and can lend support to analogizing deed reformation for
scriveners' mistakes to proposed will reformation. Finally, because contrac-
tual will substitutes can be reformed for scriveners' errors even after the
death of the transferor-depositor, a comparison of contract reformation with
will reformation also is appropriate.
In contract law, a mutual mistake made by the parties to an agreement
which does not accurately express the intention of the parties is grounds for
reforming the contract. 4 6 Parol evidence is admissible to establish such a
mistake,""' although the error must be proved by clear and convincing evi-
dence. t ' s Most courts hold that scriveners' mistakes in contracts are also
probate, changes in the nature of wealth holding and the need to reconcile nonprobate trans-
fers with the supposed monopoly of probate).
143. See 1 W. PAGE, WILLS § 13.8, at 676-77 (3d ed. 1960).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 102-41.
145. See 6 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 2936, at 5 (1962).
146. See Newmister v. Carmichael, 29 Wis. 2d 573, 576-77, 139 N.W.2d 572, 574 (1966).
Another ground for reformation is unilateral mistake by one of the parties accompanied by
fraudulent or inequitable conduct by the other. See Lopinto v. Haines, 185 Conn. 527, 531,
441 A.2d 151, 154 (1981); Maryland Port Admin. v. John W. Brawner Contracting Co., 303
Md. 44, 59, 492 A.2d 281, 288 (1985); Johnson v. Johnson, 379 N.W.2d 215, 219 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985); Cokins v. Frandsen, 141 N.W.2d 796, 799 (N.D. 1966). Some courts even hold
that a unilateral mistake may be reformed if the other party knew or should have known of the
erroneous understanding. See Flippo Constr. Co. v. Mike Parks Diving Corp., 531 A.2d 263,
271 (D.C. 1987); see also 13 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1585, at 555-56 (3d ed. 1970)
(where a written instrument fails to express intent of parties due to mutual mistake in its
interpretation, reformation is allowed); id. § 1549A, at 139-40 (discussing sample case which
allows reformation of contract where mutual mistake frustrates parties' intent); Palmer, Refor-
mation and the Parol Evidence Rule, 65 MICH. L. REV. 833, 838 (1967) (courts should reform
agreements whether incorrect term is a product of mutual mistake or intentional).
147. See Pinnacle Peak Developers v. TRW Inv. Corp., 129 Ariz. 385, 389, 631 P.2d 540,
544 (Ct. App. 1980); Turnpaugh v. Wolf, 482 N.E.2d 506, 508 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Kiser v.
Eberly, 200 Md. 242, 247, 88 A.2d 570, 573 (1952); Newmister, 29 Wis. 2d at 577, 139 N.W.2d
at 574; Comment, The Parol Evidence Rule-A New Exception, 16 MD. L. REV. 330, 331-32
(1956).
148. See Mansell v. Lord Lumber & Fuel Co., 348 Ill. 140, 151-52, 180 N.E. 774, 778
(1932); Ellison v. Watson, 53 Or. App. 923, 928, 633 P.2d 840, 843 (1981); In re Mellinger's
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subject to reformation, 4 9 based upon the theory that a scrivener's error re-
ally constitutes a mutual mistake by the parties to the contract.' 50 Even
omissions, whether caused by a draftsman's error or not, can usually be re-
formed as a type of mutual mistake if the contract does not conform to the
original intention of the parties.''
Contractual will substitutes may also be reformed. For example, a life
insurance policy may be reformed if a mutual mistake is established between
the insured and the insurer, even after the death of the insured. 5 2 The mis-
take may even involve the name of the beneficiary.' 3 Significantly, most
courts hold that scriveners' errors in life insurance policies usually constitute
mutual mistakes."3 4 Because a life insurance policy is functionally indistin-
guishable from a will in that a life insurance policy is revocable until the
death of the insured (testator), and the interest of the beneficiary is ambula-
tory until the insured's (testator's) death,5 5 courts should permit reforma-
tion for scriveners' errors in wills. In addition, under the Uniform Probate
Code, reformation appears available for joint bank accounts' 5 6 and for trust
accounts.'" Clear and convincing evidence of an intent different from the
words used in the account is permissible to prove a contrary meaning. This
Estate, 334 Pa. 180, 185, 5 A.2d 321, 323 (1939); Newmister, 29 Wis. 2d at 577, 139 N.W.2d at
574; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 511 (1932).
149. See, e.g., Gartner v. Gartner, 246 Minn. 319, 322, 74 N.W.2d 809, 812 (1956); Surlak
v. Surlak, 95 A.D.2d 371, 380, 466 N.Y.S.2d 461, 475 (1983); Woodriff v. Ashcraft, 263 Or.
547, 551, 503 P.2d 472, 474 (1972).
150. See Williams v. Hudgens, 217 Ga. 706, 710, 124 S.E.2d 746, 750 (1962); see also
Marano v. Corbisiero, 27 Misc. 2d 830, 832, 211 N.Y.S.2d 108, 111 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (a court
cannot reform a lease unless there is a scrivener's error, mutual mistake, or fraud).
151. See Crawford v. France, 219 Cal. 439, 442-43, 27 P.2d 645, 646 (1933); Butler v.
Threlkeld, 117 Iowa 116, 90 N.W. 584 (1902); McMee v. Henry, 163 Ky. 729, 732, 174 S.W.
746, 747-48 (1915); Katz v. American Technical Indus., Inc., 96 A.D.2d 932, 933, 466
N.Y.S.2d 378, 380-81 (1983); Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Castile, 283 S.C. 1, 3-4, 320
S.E.2d 488, 490 (Ct. App. 1984); Palmer, Reformation and the Statute of Frauds, 65 MICH. L.
REV. 421, 424 (1967).
152. See Bugen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 408 Pa. 472, 475, 184 A.2d 499, 500 (1962);
Crosby v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 293 S.C. 203, 206, 359 S.E.2d 298, 300 (Ct. App. 1987);
Merriam v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 169 Tenn. 291, 297, 86 S.W.2d 566, 569 (1935);
see also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 124 Vt. 114, 118, 197 A.2d 813, 816 (1964) (if a writing
does not reflect parties' intent, party penalized by the error is entitled to reformation if other
party has not experienced prejudicial change of position while unaware of the mistake).
153. See Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Abramson, 530 A.2d 1202, 1210-11 (D.C. 1987).
154. See Schaefer v. California-Western States Life Ins. Co., 262 Cal. App. 2d 840, 845, 69
Cal. Rptr. 183, 186 (1968); Johnson v. Consolidated Am. Life Ins. Co., 244.So. 2d 400, 402-03
(Miss. 1971).
155. See Langbein, supra note 142, at 1110.
156. See UNIF. PRoB. CODE § 6-104(a) (1983).
157. See id. § 6-104(c)(2).
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situation can include declarations of intention by the decedent-depositor' 58
Most courts also allow parol evidence to vary the meaning of the language of
a joint bank account.' 59 Because a joint bank account can approximate the
incidents of a will,"o reformation should be available to help explain a testa-
mentary provision in a will.
In property law, courts may reform a written instrument, such as a deed
executed for consideration, if the mistake is mutual and if the writing does
not accurately reflect the intention of the parties."'6 Generally, the mistake
must be as to the words in the deed rather than their legal effect.' 62 Parol
evidence is admissible in a reformation action for a deed, 163 and must be
clear and convincing to support the correction.' Scriveners' mistakes,
viewed as mutual mistakes by most courts, 65 are also subject to reforma-
158. See, e.g., Winsor v. Powell, 209 Kan. 292, 299, 497 P.2d 292, 300 (1972); Desrosiers v.
Germain, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 852, 429 N.E.2d 385 (1981), review denied, 385 Mass. 1102, 440
N.E.2d 1174 (1982).
159. See, e.g., In re Estate of Matthews, 208 Kan. 492, 507, 493 P.2d 555, 564 (1972); see
also Otto v. Klement, 656 S.W.2d 678, 682 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (certificate of deposit).
160. See Langbein, supra note 142, at 1112.
161. See Paradise Hills Church, Inc. v. International Church of the Foursquare Gospel,
467 F. Supp. 357 (D. Ariz. 1979); Tilbury v. Osmundson, 143 Colo. 12, 15-16, 352 P.2d 102,
104 (1960); Brady v. Berke, 33 Md. App. 27, 31-32, 363 A.2d 537, 540 (1976); Toth v. Vaz-
quez, 8 N.J. Super. 289, 293, 74 A.2d 331, 334 (1950), cert. denied, 7 N.J. 76, 80 A.2d 494
(1951); Cleary Petroleum Corp. v. Harrison, 621 P.2d 528, 533 (Okla. 1980); State v. Wales,
271 S.W.2d 728, 732-33 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). Reformation is also available for unilateral
mistake by one of the parties, if coupled with inequitable conduct by the other. See Ayers v.
Thompson, 536 So. 2d 1151, 1154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). Some courts also allow reforma-
tion for a unilateral mistake of a donor in a gratuitous transfer because "the expectations of a
donee are less worthy of protection than are those of a transferee who gives value for the
property transferred." Yohe v. Yohe, 466 Pa. 405, 417, 353 A.2d 417, 424 (1976) (Pomeroy,
J., concurring).
162. See Boone v. Grier, 142 Ariz. 178, 688 P.2d 1070 (Ct. App. 1984). But see Scott v.
Grow, 301 Mich. 226, 237, 3 N.W.2d 254, 258 (1942) (no equitable relief where mistake as to
legal effect of instrument which was deliberately executed and adopted).
163. See Ayers, 536 So. 2d at 1154.
164. See Hereford v. Unknown Heirs, 315 S.W.2d 412, 419 (Mo. 1958); Le Mehaute v. Le
Mehaute, 585 S.W.2d 276, 281 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Praggastis v. Sandner, 40 Or. App. 477,
484, 595 P.2d 520, 524 (1979). But see Frierson v. Sheppard, 201 Miss. 603, 29 So. 2d 726
(1947) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt required).
165. See Pinson v. Veach, 388 So. 2d 964, 966 (Ala. 1980); Clipper v. Gordon, 253 Ala.
428, 431, 44 So. 2d 576, 578 (1950); Roots v. Uppole, 81 111. App. 3d 68, 72-73, 400 N.E.2d
1003, 1006 (1980); Reder v. Kuss, 351 Mass. 15, 17, 217 N.E.2d 904, 905 (1966); Franz v.
Franz, 308 Mass. 262, 266, 32 N.E.2d 205, 208 (1941); Newton v. Brown, 222 Neb. 605, 612,
386 N.W.2d 424, 430 (1986); Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625, 634 (Wyo. 1986). But see Hood
v. Owens, 293 S.W. 774, 779 (Mo. 1927) (scrivener's error may constitute a unilateral mis-
take); Cox v. Cox, 725 S.W.2d 880, 883 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (same).
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tion.'" Even omissions from a deed caused by an error of the draftsman
have been reformed. 67
Significantly, in the case of a gift of a deed of property, the grantor may
reform the deed if he makes a unilateral mistake and if the writing fails to
express his true intent at the time he made the gift.' 6 ' This reformation is
allowed even if the grantee will ultimately receive less than the writing ini-
tially granted him.169 Reformation is often available even after the death of
the grantor, 7° if the reformation is necessary to effectuate the grantor's in-
tent. 17' As a corollary, because the grantee has not given any consideration,
he usually may not reform a gratuitous deed as against the grantor. 72 Nev-
ertheless, many courts permit the grantee to reform a deed of gift as against
the grantor's heirs after the grantor's death. 173 If a grantee has a remedy
after the grantor's death for a mistake made in a deed of gift, then a will
beneficiary who is the natural object of the testator's bounty should have a
similar option. The only impediment seems to be the Statute of Wills, but its
166. See Sampson v. Mudge, 13 F. 260, 261-62 (D. Mass. 1882); Fidelity Serv. Ins. Co. v.
A.B. Legg & Sons Burial Ins. Co., 274 Ala. 94, 99, 145 So. 2d 811, 815 (1962); Berendsen v.
McIver, 126 Cal. App. 2d 347, 272 P.2d 76 (1954); Robinson v. Wright, 217 Ga. 199, 199, 121
S.E.2d 640, 641 (1961); Schlatter v. Ibarra, 218 Kan. 67, 70, 542 P.2d 710, 719 (1975);
Blanchard v. Kingston, 222 Mich. 631, 634, 193 N.W. 241, 243 (1923); Johnson v. Giese, 231
Minn. 258, 263, 42 N.W.2d 712, 716 (1950); McAllister v. Richardson, 103 Miss. 418, 431, 60
So. 570, 571 (1912).
167. See Whitt v. Proctor, 305 Ky. 454, 456, 204 S.W.2d 582, 583 (1947); Sunnybrook
Children's Home, Inc. v. Dahlem, 265 So. 2d 921 (Miss. 1972); Katchen v. Silberman, 109
N.J. Eq. 613, 615, 158 A. 427, 427 (Ch. 1932); Cornish v. Yarbrough, 558 S.W.2d 28, 32 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1977). The rule is otherwise if the deed lacks consideration for its execution. See
Harrod v. Simmons, 143 So. 2d 717, 719 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
168. See Hohneke v. Ferguson, 196 Neb. 505, 508, 244 N.W.2d 70, 71-72 (1976); Davidson
v. Lane, 566 S.W.2d 891, 892 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978); 4 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 985,
at 146 (3d ed. Cum. Supp. 1990).
169. See Comment, Mistake of Fact as a Ground for Affirmative Equitable Relief 23 HARV.
L. REV. 608, 620 (1910).
170. See Spencer v. Spencer, 115 Miss. 71, 81, 75 So. 770, 771 (1917); Henderson, Mistake
and Fraud in Wills-Part I: A Comparative Analysis of Existing Law, 47 B.U.L. REV. 303, 393
(1967).
171. Presumably, this situation would also include a will substitute such as a joint tenancy
deed in need of reformation.
172. See Reinberg v. Heiby, 404 II1. 247, 253, 88 N.E.2d 848, 851 (1949); Dunn v. Dunn,
242 N.C. 234, 239, 87 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1955).
173. See Dowding v. Dowding, 152 Neb. 61, 72, 40 N.W.2d 245, 250 (1949); Zabolotny v.
Fedorenko, 315 N.W.2d 668, 672 (N.D. 1982); Hazlett v. Bryant, 192 Tenn. 251, 260, 241
S.W.2d 121, 125 (1951); see also Reinberg, 404 Il1. at 255, 88 N.E.2d at 852 (reformation of
deed allowed as between grantees). In addition, some courts have held that where a would-be
donor subsequently dies mistakenly believing he has made a valid gift, the donee may impose a
constructive trust on the donor's heirs, especially if the intended donee is a natural object of
the donor's bounty. See 5 A. ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 466.2, at 3434 (3d ed. 1967).
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purpose can be fulfilled by requiring clear and convincing proof of the
mistake.
In trust law, a settlor's unilateral mistake is sufficient to reform an inter
vivos trust, provided the settlor received no consideration for the creation of
the trust.174 The same rule applies even after the death of the settlor, pro-
vided the reformation is necessary to carry out his intent. 75 Courts have
freqently corrected scriveners' errors by reforming unilateral mistakes in
trust instruments. 176 In addition, courts have corrected omissions resulting
from scriveners' mistakes. 177 Because a revocable inter vivos trust can imi-
tate a will, in that the settlor can retain the equitable life interest and the
power to alter or revoke the beneficiary designation, 17 the differing result
hinges on terminology. Significantly, a scrivener's error can serve as a basis
to reform a pour over will. 179 A court, however, generally will not reform a
testamentary trust under similar circumstances, unless the will which con-
tained the trust can be reformed. 8 ° It seems arbitrary for the law to hold
that an inter vivos trust used as a receptacle for assets poured over from
probate can be reformed, while a testamentary trust cannot. If will substi-
174. See Berger v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 49, 51 (W.D. Pa. 1988); In re Trust Estate of
La Rocca, 411 Pa. 633, 639, 192 A.2d 409, 412 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 333a App. (1988).
175. See Roos v. Roos, 42 Del. Ch. 40, 43, 203 A.2d 140, 142 (1964); Kiser v. Lucas, 170
Md. 486, 496-97, 135 A. 441, 446 (1936); Berman v. Sandier, 379 Mass. 506, 510, 399 N.E.2d
17, 19 (1980).
176. See Liberty Trust Co. v. Weber, 200 Md. 523, 524, 91 A.2d 393, 394 (1952); Berman,
379 Mass. at 510, 399 N.E.2d at 19; Savings Inv. & Trust Co. v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 17 N.J. Super. 50, 56, 85 A.2d 311, 312 (Ch. Div. 1951); In re Estate of Duncan, 426 Pa.
283, 289, 232 A.2d 717, 720 (1967); Brinker v. Wobaco Trust, Ltd., 610 S.W.2d 160, 164 (Tex.
Civ. Ct. App. 1980); G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 991, at 215 (2d ed.
1983).
177. See Connecticut Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Art Inst., 341 Ill. App. 624, 637, 94
N.E.2d 602, 608 (1950), aff'd, 409 11. 481, 100 N.E.2d 625 (1951); Leitner v. Goldwater, 48
N.Y.S.2d 614 (Sup. Ct. 1944), afid, 269 A.D. 657, 53 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1945); see also Mortimer
v. Mortimer, 6 111. App. 3d 217, 222, 285 N.E.2d 542, 546 (1972) (omission of power to revoke
or modify trust susceptible to reformation); Findorff v. Findorff, 3 Wis. 2d 215, 225. 88
N.W.2d 327, 332 (1958) (to grant reformation of trust agreement, party must establish misrep-
resentation or fraud by settlor in omitting power to revoke); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 332 (1959) (trust may be reformed where power to revoke or modify trust omitted).
178. See Langbein, supra note 142, at 1113.
179. See Heritage Bank-North, N.A. v. Hunterdon Medical Cent., 164 N.J. Super. 33, 35
n.1, 395 A.2d 552, 553 n.1 (App. Div. 1978); Brinker v. Wobaco Trust, Ltd., 610 S.W.2d 160,
162 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1980) (pour over will is a common estate planning device whereby
residue of an estate is transferred or "poured" into a revocable inter vivos trust upon settlor's
death).
180. See also In re Estate of Manville, 112 Misc. 2d 355, 447 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Sur. Ct. 1982)




tutes, including revocable trusts, can be reformed for scriveners' errors, then
wills should also be able to be reformed under similar circumstances, espe-
cially when both kinds of instruments accomplish the same testamentary
objectives.
VI. CONCLUSION
When a scrivener's error occurs in a will, and is uncovered only after the
death of the testator, the disposition of the testator's estate may be thrown
into considerable disarray. Although scriveners' mistakes in wills can be
avoided through painstaking insistence on accuracy by the testator and his
draftsman, there is no way to eliminate completely the possibility of human
error. The traditional rule of "no reformation for mistake," including that
of a scrivener, no longer seems justified because the effect of a scrivener's
error is the same as that of fraud, duress, or undue influence-they all vitiate
the testator's intent. Because extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove unsa-
vory conduct that interferes with the testator's wishes, such evidence should
also be admissible to show a mistake that alters the testator's intent in much
the same way. The growing acceptance of the admissibility of extrinsic evi-
dence to shed light on will provisions in will construction proceedings indi-
cates that many courts are now more willing to accept clear and convincing
evidence to explain or even alter the words of the written document. More-
over, reformation already takes place in many areas of estate law, although
few courts acknowledge the process. Finally, because courts reform inter
vivos will substitutes based on scriveners' errors, courts should also reform
wills themselves, which are purer in form and serve the same purpose. 8"
A rule that allows reformation of a will or will provision for a scrivener's
error also makes practical sense. Scriveners' mistakes should not be allowed
to disrupt a testator's plan of distribution. By allowing reformation for a
scrivener's error, the testator's intent can be given the primary importance
that it deserves in the construction and reformation of wills.
181. One commentator has proposed a model statute which would allow reformation of a
will for mistake through the use of extrinsic evidence. See Henderson, Mistake and Fraud in
Wills--Part II: A Suggested Statutory Departure, 47 B.U.L. REV. 461, 510-11 (1967).
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